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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY IN 
MORALITY AND LAW 
Larry D. Barnett* 
“When they discover the center of the universe, 
a lot of people will be disappointed to discover 
they are not it.” Bernard Bailey1 
OVERVIEW 
The article advances the thesis that the doctrines and 
concepts of law are attributable to the properties of society and 
to the forces molding these properties. The thesis, after being 
illustrated with the federal Investment Advisers Act, is assessed 
quantitatively using data from a survey of a national sample of 
adults in U.S. households. The survey, which was conducted in 
1991, ascertained whether interviewees classified morality as a 
private matter or as a public issue. The public or private nature 
                                                          
* Professor, School of Law, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware 
19803-0474 USA. Email address: ldbarnett@widener.edu. 
The preparation of this article benefitted from the resources and 
excellent staff of the Widener University Legal Information Center in 
Wilmington, Delaware. For their assistance, I would like to thank the 
following members of the Center staff: David King, Enza Klotzbucher, Mary 
Jane Mallonee, and Kelly Pierce. 
Parts III and IV of this article were presented in July 2009 in Oñati, 
Spain at the annual meeting of the Research Committee on the Sociology of 
Law.  They were also presented in September 2009 in Wilmington, Delaware 
at the Widener University School of Law.  Questions and comments from 
persons attending these presentations were helpful to me in clarifying Parts 
III and IV. I am, of course, solely responsible for any errors that remain. 
1 Michael Moncur’s Cynical Quotations, The Quotations Page, http:// 
www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Bernard_Bailey *last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
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of morality in social values was the dependent variable in a 
study that assumed (i) law does not attempt to regulate an 
activity, or explicitly protects the activity from regulation, when 
society designates the activity as private, and (ii) the doctrines of 
law designed to regulate activities that are designated public 
embody the doctrines of prevailing morality. 
Because social values on whether morality is private or 
public comprised the dependent variable, the factors that mold 
these values have the potential to prevent or permit law designed 
to regulate socially significant activities. Logistic regression was 
used to estimate the relationship to the dependent variable of two 
sets of factors that may influence whether morality is designated 
private or public. One set was factors that structure (e.g., 
stratify) a society and that have important societal correlates and 
consequences. The other set was comprised of modes of thought 
and conduct that are cultural dimensions of a society. Notable 
relationships to the dependent variable were found for the 
structural factors of gender and, among women, educational 
attainment. In terms of gender, the odds that morality would be 
considered a private matter were approximately three-and-a-half 
times higher among women than among men. In terms of 
education, the odds that morality would be considered private 
were approximately three-fourths lower among women with 
thirteen or more years of schooling than among women with 
twelve or fewer years of schooling. The article suggests that, 
because the odds of placing morality in the private sphere are 
appreciably greater among women, gains in the status of women 
may help to explain U.S. Supreme Court decisions that 
construed the Constitution to restrict government regulation of 
sexual activity and its incidents. 
I. THE RULE AND ROLE OF LAW IN SOCIETY 
A. The Rule of Law 
The concept underlying the phrase “the rule of law” conveys 
a specific image both of the nature of law and of the role of law 
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in society. The concept is pertinent to the instant article because 
it is embedded in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence2 and is generally 
believed to be a key to the success of modern societies.3 In the 
United States, the concept enjoys widespread support,4 and if 
this support accurately gauges the prevalence of the concept and 
of the image of law linked to the concept, a large fraction of 
Americans believe law to be a significant aspect of their 
country. Not surprisingly, persons in law-related occupations 
share that belief, and they may assign even greater importance 
than the public to “the rule of law.” In their view, both the 
structure and operation of U.S. society depend on law.5 Thus, 
the concept of “the rule of law” has been employed to suggest 
that the existence6 and equilibrium7 of a society are impossible 
without law. According to this view, “we have survived and 
prospered as a free nation because we have adhered to the rule 
of law.”8 
What, however, is “the rule of law”? When does “the rule 
of law” exist? A concept, to be useful, must have an identifiable 
                                                          
2 Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The 
Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing 
Principles of Political Economy, 69 UMKC L. REV. 733, 753 (2001) 
(referring to “the rule of law” as “the bedrock of western law”). 
3 See, e.g., Martin Krygier & Whit Mason, Violence, Development and 
the Rule of Law 2 (Univ. of N.S.W., Research Paper No. 2008-8, 2008) 
(“The rule of law is so popular these days that there is little it is not called 
upon to do or to fix.”). 
4 James L. Gibson, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of 
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 603–05 (2007). 
5 Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 
1223 (Utah 1999) (Stewart, J, concurring) (contending that the rule of law 
and the protections it affords are necessary for a capitalist economy and 
personal safety). 
6 See Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. SST Concorde Alert 
Program, 394 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (“History proves that our 
society can survive only by law or else be consumed and destroyed by 
man . . . .”).  
7 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting in part) (“The rule of law is important in the stability of society.”). 
8 Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1272 (Fla. 2000) (Harding, J., 
dissenting). 
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referent, but the concept of “the rule of law” has no generally 
accepted referent or set of referents.9 Nonetheless, “the rule of 
law” would seem to be associated with the presence of at least 
four conditions:10 (i) the law of the society has unambiguous 
standards; (ii) the standards are the same for, and are applied in 
the same way to, all members of a category of human beings or 
entities; (iii) the categories that are used by law to differentiate 
human beings and entities, and the standards of each category, 
are accepted by the society; and (iv) the standards for a given 
category are manifested in the behavior and activities of the 
members of the category. The preceding list of attributes of “the 
rule of law” is consistent with conclusions regarding law that 
courts and scholars have reached—that law must be fair11 in 
content,12 appearance,13 and application.14  However, despite its 
                                                          
9 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Faith in the Rule of Law, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 573, 576 (2008) (explaining the difficulty in defining the rule of law). 
10 The elements of the rule of law that have been enumerated in “leading 
modern accounts” of the concept are summarized in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 8–9 (1997). Professor Fallon indicates that the concept of “the rule 
of law” is an ideal but points out that agreement has not been reached on the 
elements of the ideal.  Id. at 10, 55. 
11 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998) 
(noting that the enforcement of law is unconstitutional when it fails to 
“comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency”); see also People 
ex. rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1985) (noting 
that law cannot be useful “[W]ithout a belief by the people that the system [of 
law] is just and impartial”). 
12 See David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional 
Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2621, 2640 (2006) (“[L]aws on the books play 
an essential role in the fair and just exercise of legal force.”). 
13 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (pointing out the 
importance that “legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them”); 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (remarking that the 
judiciary must provide “the appearance and reality of fairness” in order to 
“‘generat[e] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice 
has been done’”). 
14 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (observing that law in 
the United States demands equality in its development and execution). 
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importance to maintaining cohesion in a society,15 fairness does 
not seem to be the primary focus of the concept of “the rule of 
law.” Instead, the concept by its very name highlights the idea 
of rule. With this emphasis, the concept of “the rule of law” 
suggests that the law of a society controls,16 and thus is followed 
by, the individuals and entities in the society.17 Indeed, the 
concept means literally that, in a society characterized by the 
rule of law, there is obedience to law.18  Law, in a word, 
regulates. 
B. Law as a Regulator 
In the United States, then, law is believed to be at the heart 
of society, and the belief seems to rest heavily on the 
assumption that, in a society whose structure is complex and 
whose population is large and diverse, law is a highly effective 
means of guiding the behavior of individuals and the activities of 
groups. But is law successful when it seeks to regulate, i.e., 
control, important aspects of social life? An explicit or implicit 
intent to regulate, directly or indirectly, is embedded in law as 
an institution19—to the degree that a society deems behavior X to 
                                                          
15 See Joel Brockner et al., The Influence on Prior Commitment to an 
Institution on Reactions to Perceived Unfairness: The Higher They Are, the 
Harder They Fall, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 241 (1992). 
16 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 
(1983) (referring to the United States as “a society governed by the rule of 
law” (emphasis added)). The word “rule” is defined to include “[a] principle, 
regulation, or maxim governing individual conduct.” 14 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 228 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). The word “govern” has 
among its definitions “to direct and control the actions and affairs of (a 
people, a state or its members).” 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 709 (2d 
ed. 1989). 
17 ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY 259–60 (1995); see Gibson, 
supra note 4, at 597 (“[T]he essential ingredient of the rule of law is 
universalism—the law should be universally heeded.” (emphasis omitted)). 
18 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 213 (1979).  
19 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 75 (1919); Elie Mischel, Note, “Thou 
Shalt Not Go About as a Talebearer Among Thy People”: Jewish Law and the 
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be desirable and public in nature, the law of the society will 
seek to increase the frequency of X, and to the extent that a 
society deems behavior Y to be undesirable and public, the law 
of the society will be designed to eliminate (or at least reduce) 
the occurrence of Y. However, if law does not fulfill its 
regulatory goal, i.e., if law does not appreciably affect the 
behaviors and activities it targets, the contention that law is 
critical to a society must either be abandoned or, if retained, 
justified on other grounds. 
Unfortunately for the advocates of the contention that law is 
an effective regulatory mechanism, a substantial body of well-
designed quantitative research has found that law does not 
appreciably and permanently alter social patterns. Briefly stated, 
the research indicates that the impact on targeted social behavior 
of law-based regulation is generally just minimal in the long 
term, and if and when the impact is substantial, it is short-
lived.20 Moreover, regulation can have effects that are unwanted 
by or harmful to society.21 Accordingly, the center of the 
                                                          
Private Facts Tort, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 811, 821 (2006). 
20 Notable studies are cited and summarized in Larry D. Barnett, Law as 
Symbol: Appearances in the Regulation of Investment Advisers and Attorneys, 
55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 289, 300–01 nn.65–67 (2007) [hereinafter Law as 
Symbol] and in Larry D. Barnett, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Boards of 
Directors: Financial Protection or Social Productivity?, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 
489, 528–29 nn.163–66, 530 n.168 (2008) [hereinafter Regulation of Mutual 
Fund Boards of Directors]. Further supporting evidence, in conjunction with 
an exceptional discussion of the research design needed to assess accurately 
the impact of law, can be found in Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of 
the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cautionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time 
Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 361 
(1996). 
21 See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal 
Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89 (2001) (finding a 
substantial rise in homicides from the enactment of state statutes that require 
individuals, upon a third conviction for a violent crime, to be sentenced to a 
lengthy prison term without possibility of parole); David Neumark & Wendy 
A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Sex and Race Discrimination Laws, 44 
ECON. INQUIRY 385, 411 (2006) (finding that the earnings of employed white 
women and of employed black women are reduced in the short term, though 
raised in the long term, by state statutes banning sex-based differentials in 
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universe is unlikely to be either law as a set of ideas or the 
individuals who write and apply the doctrines of law. If the 
universe has a sociological center, it is evidently not a particular 
institution but society itself.22 
C. Law in a Macrosociological Framework 
The thesis of the present article is that the concepts and 
doctrines of law are macrosociological phenomena. Law is thus 
treated in the article as a component of a larger social system, 
i.e., of a society. In this framework, law as a societal 
component is deemed to be an institution—i.e., a pattern of 
human interaction that is common in, and a contributor to the 
functioning of, the society in which it exists.23 The concepts and 
doctrines of the institution of law are assumed by the framework 
to result from the properties of society and the forces that mold 
these properties. In the United States, however, such a 
framework contradicts conventional thinking because the 
framework considers individual human beings, including those 
who are prominent in politics and those who are charismatic, to 
have no long-term impact on the core content of law in a 
democracy.24 Although my framework recognizes that an 
individual can trigger a lasting change in the doctrines of law in 
a democracy, it contends that an individual can do so only when 
                                                          
pay and that employment in these groups is reduced by such statutes in the 
short term). 
22 See Larry D. Barnett, Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, and the Public-
Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework for Law 38–39 
(Interuniversity Ctr. for Research on the Sociology of Law, Info. and Legal 
Insts., Working Paper No. 34, 2008), available at http://www.cirsdig.it/ 
Pubblicazioni/barnett.pdf [hereinafter Public-Private Dichotomy in a 
Macrosociological Framework]. 
23 Sociologically, an institution is a set of statuses and roles (i) that a 
society defines and endorses and (ii) that involve interpersonal relationships 
through which a socially approved type of activity takes place in the society.  
Howard B. Kaplan, The Concept of Institution: A Review, Evaluation, and 
Suggested Research Procedure, 39 SOC. FORCES 176, 179 (1960). 
24 Individualism is a dominant theme in the culture and law of the United 
States. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
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society-level properties and forces create the trigger. A 
particular individual who triggers such a change is not essential 
to the change, however, because other individuals could and 
would also have done so. In my macrosociological framework, 
then, explanations of non-ephemeral change in the central ideas 
of law in a democracy are wrong when they attribute the change 
to specific individuals, because the process that shapes these 
ideas involves fungible individuals. 
While quantitative research bearing on this framework is in 
its infancy, the findings of currently available studies are 
consistent with it. What does existing research suggest are the 
most important societal properties that produce concepts and 
doctrines of law? 25 In answering the question, I will also touch 
on the key societal forces that seem to be responsible for 
changing the societal properties pertinent to law. The discussion 
of the properties and forces will inform the analyses undertaken 
in subsequent parts of the instant article. 
One property that evidently affects the law of a society is the 
educational attainment of the members of the society. The 
importance of education may arise from the relationship that 
exists between educational level and rationality. Specifically, 
education is at least a concomitant, and is probably a cause, of 
the extent of rationality in a society. As a societal property, 
educational attainment is likely to result from one large-scale 
force in particular—the quantity and quality of knowledge that is 
being used by a society.26   
A second property that apparently has a bearing on the 
content of law in a society is the degree of urbanization in the 
society or, more precisely, the proportion of the inhabitants of 
the society who are exposed to high population density. 
Rationality is heightened among individuals who live and/or 
work in large cities, theory suggests, because these individuals 
                                                          
25 The most persuasive of these studies are reviewed in Public-Private 
Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra note 22, at 11–13. That 
review is the basis for the discussion which follows in the text. 
26 Id. at 25–26; Larry D. Barnett, The Roots of Law, 15 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 613, 630–32, 677–79 (2007) [hereinafter The 
Roots of Law]. 
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are exposed to a wide range of changing stimuli.27 The density 
of population in a society, of course, results from the rates of 
fertility and mortality in the society, from the pace and patterns 
of migration within the society, and from the rates of 
immigration into and emigration out of the society. 
A third property that may shape the content of law in a 
society is the extent and severity of social, cultural, and 
economic divisions within the population of the society.  The 
law of a society results from conditions that have an impact on 
the society, and a plausible argument can be made that law can 
be affected by social, cultural, and economic fractures in the 
population of the society, e.g., by cleavages on the basis of 
race,28 national origin, and/or income. For example, as the 
population of a society becomes more heterogeneous in terms of 
national origin, the law of the society is more likely to 
incorporate doctrines that are symbols29 in order to counteract 
the reduction in social cohesion caused by the heterogeneity.30 
A further aspect of divisions within a society merits a brief 
discussion here. Given a split in a society, law can be 
formulated to pursue one of two objectives. First, law may 
accept the continuation of the division but concern itself with 
curbing unwanted activities (e.g., crime) to which the division is 
believed to be a contributor.31 Second, law may be concerned 
with erasing the division, as in the case of statutes banning 
discrimination in employment. Unfortunately, the societal 
conditions producing law that has the former concern rather than 
                                                          
27 GEORG SIMMEL, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF GEORG SIMMEL 409, 409–10 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., Free Press 
1950). 
28 See Joe Soss et al., Why Do White Americans Support the Death 
Penalty?, 65 J. POL. 397, 415–16 (2003) (finding with cross-sectional data 
that, among Caucasians, approval of the death penalty for individuals 
convicted of murder varies with, inter alia, prejudice toward blacks). 
29 Law as Symbol, supra note 20, at 315, 324, 328–29. 
30 Hilde Coffé & Benny Geys, Community Heterogeneity: A Burden for 
the Creation of Social Capital?, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1053, 1065, 1068 (2006). 
31 David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the 
Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 109, 
111 (2002). 
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the latter concern have yet to be identified,32 but the existence of 
one concern rather than the other may depend, inter alia, on the 
degree to which the division creates friction between the 
different sides of the division. Whatever the reason, the 
doctrines of law do not occur by accident; rather, they are 
adopted in response to, and are designed to improve, the 
conditions of social life. 
However, if law exists to benefit society, the question is why 
law acts in the interests of society. What explains the 
subservience of law to the society in which the law exists? In 
my framework, a society is a system, and a system, by 
definition, is organized.33 Being organized, a system is more 
than the simple combination of its components, and a society, 
therefore, is a discrete entity with distinct properties of its own. 
Alternatively expressed, a society is comprised of structured 
networks of interaction between members of a population, and 
                                                          
32 One study has found that certain indicators of state-level social and 
economic divisions predict whether states have statutes that authorize the 
death penalty. Id. at 121–22. However, the study did not include a control 
for, and thus did not remove, state differences in knowledge use and, hence, 
in rationality. Id. For example, differences between states in the educational 
attainment and occupational composition of their inhabitants were not 
controlled by the study with data on, respectively, the percentage of state 
inhabitants that had completed four (or more) years of college and the 
percentage of state inhabitants employed in white-collar occupations. Id. 
Differences between education levels as well as differences between 
occupations result from differences in quantity and quality of knowledge. The 
Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 630–31, 678. Support for the death penalty is 
affected by educational level. Soss et al., supra note 28, at 408, 415; Steven 
F. Messner et al., Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and 
Support for Capital Punishment, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 559, 576 (2006). 
Support for the death penalty probably varies by occupation, too, because 
occupations differ in the amount and type of knowledge required for their 
duties.  Thus, state differences in knowledge use could account for the 
relationship between social and economic divisions in states, on the one hand, 
and the existence of state death-penalty statutes, on the other. 
33 A system is “[a] set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or 
interdependent, so as to form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in 
orderly arrangement according to some scheme or plan . . . .” 17 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 496 (2d ed. 1989). 
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both the network structure and the population possess properties 
that their members do not have.34 
If a system comprised of institutions—i.e., a society—has an 
existence that is independent of its components (institutions), as 
a macrosociological framework contends, the system will tend to 
persist. A society, being a system, will normally be supported 
by its institutions, according to the framework, and it will 
therefore generally be characterized by inertia and by a 
propensity for self-preservation. This reasoning, if correct, 
permits the question posed in the prior paragraph to be answered 
tentatively—a society develops and utilizes particular concepts 
and doctrines of law because it is, and the concepts and 
doctrines of law help to make it, a self-sustaining entity. 
A related, and important, macrosociological proposition is 
that, being a system composed of institutions, a society is 
independent of the individual human beings in it even though, at 
a given time, the society operates through these human beings. 
From a macrosociological perspective, individuals are irrelevant. 
As a result, the particular individuals who populate a society are 
believed to have no direct, enduring influence on the institution 
of law. In the macrosociological framework of this article, the 
content of law in a society, and the impact of law on patterns of 
social activity, are thus expected to be affected no more than 
temporarily by the individuals who write and enforce statutes, 
administrative agency rules, and court decisions. 
Why are individuals unable to have a substantial, permanent 
impact on law—at least in a society such as the United States 
that has a large, heterogeneous population and a complex set of 
institutions? The chief reason is probably that individuals live 
their lives in a system and the system changes in response to 
system-level forces. Furthermore, individuals have, in historical 
terms, just a relatively brief presence in the system, i.e., in a 
society.35 A society, on the other hand, lasts to the extent that it 
                                                          
34 Bruce H. Mayhew, Structuralism Versus Individualism: Part 1, 
Shadowboxing in the Dark, 59 SOC. FORCES 335, 338–39 (1980). 
35 In 2006, life expectancy at birth in the United States was 77.7 years. 
Melonie Heron et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS 
REP., Apr. 17, 2009, at 26 tbl. 7 (combining both sexes and all races) (vol. 
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is supported by its institutions, and a society will normally have 
this support because it possesses a built-in tendency to persist. 
Over the long run, accordingly, the institution of law responds 
to, and helps to fulfill, the needs of the system, not the wishes 
of the individuals in the system.36 
D. The Role of Law 
On the surface, the framework I am proposing may seem to 
imply that law is merely a puppet of the society in which it 
exists and that law performs no significant role in social life. 
The framework, however, warrants no such conclusion. If law 
were unimportant to society, law would not have lasted. Since 
the United States was founded, major changes have occurred in 
the concepts and doctrines of law, of course, but notably the 
institution of law was not abandoned. Instead, the institution of 
law continued to be used, although with revisions to its content, 
and it persisted because law was an instrument that had utility to 
society. 
The durability of law in the United States,37 in short, is 
evidence that law does something for society and that the 
societal benefits of law are not trivial. Because concepts of law 
(including the concept of “the rule of law”) and doctrines 
applying these concepts operate within a larger social system, 
their sociological functions must be understood in terms of that 
system.38 However, if my framework is helpful in understanding 
law, the societal contributions made by the concepts and 
                                                          
57, no. 14), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57 
_14.pdf. 
36 The needs of the system, however, are likely to be manifested 
typically in the expressed wishes of individuals. The concept of societal need 
is explained in The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 672–77. 
37 An indicator of the durability of law in England and the United States 
is the commonly used phrase “the Western legal tradition.” As used in the 
phrase, the word “tradition” is an activity that has persisted over a 
considerable period of time. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2422 (3d ed. 1993). 
38 Krygier & Mason, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
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doctrines of law in the United States differ appreciably from the 
contributions that these concepts and doctrines are widely 
believed to make. In my framework, the concept of “the rule of 
law” is useful to a society as an ideal,39 but the present meaning 
of the concept40 gives the concept undeserved importance 
because current assumptions regarding the societal functions of 
law are incorrect. A reassessment of the concept is thus 
required, even though the reassessment may prove 
uncomfortable and will lead to much less emphasis on the “rule 
of law.” 
What are the societal contributions of law? The contributions 
are probably the same in the United States and in other countries 
with similar sociological, economic, and demographic 
characteristics. At present, unfortunately, the sociology of law 
has an insufficient body of empirically grounded knowledge to 
provide a definitive list of the contributions that law makes to 
society. Nonetheless, a society possessing characteristics similar 
to those of the United States seems likely to benefit from law in 
at least three important ways: (i) law provides symbols that 
endorse prevailing social values, (ii) law contributes to 
preserving or improving the reputation of socially and 
economically important segments of society, and (iii) law assists 
in maintaining trust and perceptions of fairness or, when trust 
and perceptions of fairness have been damaged, in rebuilding 
them.41 Through these contributions, law strengthens the ties that 
individuals have to their society. 
Under the above line of reasoning, the function of law in a 
complex, heterogeneous society is primarily sociological rather 
than economic. This conclusion, if correct, has important 
ramifications for understanding the societal bases of law. More 
precisely, assuming that law exists mainly for sociological 
reasons, the origin and evolution of law can be expected to 
                                                          
39 COTTERRELL, supra note 17, at 271. 
40 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
41 Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of 
Conflicts of Interest in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y, & 
ETHICS J. 793, 812, 814–27 (2006) [hereinafter Social Productivity]; 
Regulation of Mutual Fund Boards of Directors, supra note 20, at 535–36. 
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develop and change in response to sociological factors, i.e., 
system-level properties and forces that are social in character. 
To illustrate, I next consider investment advisers and their 
regulation by the federal government. 
II. INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
What is an investment adviser? Broadly defined, investment 
advisers supply investment advice, i.e., guidance on a potential 
or an existing commitment of economic resources to any type of 
property from which monetary profit is sought. In this article, 
however, investment advice is construed more narrowly, and 
investment advice, while obviously involving investment,42 is 
deemed to be rendered only when the subject of the advice is a 
security.43 Investment advisers, then, are concerned with, and 
only with, securities. 
As will be explained in Part II.B. infra, Congress has 
adopted a statute that defines the occupation of “investment 
adviser” and authorizes the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to regulate the members of the occupation. The 
statute is the Investment Advisers Act (“Act”),44 but before 
turning to its provisions, I describe the importance of investment 
advisers in the United States. 
A. Investment Advisers in the Economy 
In general terms, an investment adviser is a party (i.e., 
individual or entity) that makes or recommends decisions to 
acquire and dispose of securities for particular clients.45 To be 
                                                          
42 In the present context, the word “investment” refers to “[t]he 
conversion of money or circulating capital into some species of property from 
which an income or profit is expected to be derived in the ordinary course of 
trade or business.” 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 48 (2d ed. 1989). 
43 The elements of a security are discussed in Social Productivity, supra 
note 41, at 829–32. 
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006). 
45 JEFFREY J. HAAS & STEVEN R. HOWARD, INVESTMENT ADVISER 
REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 11–12 (2008). 
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within the statutory definition, the decisions and 
recommendations, which may involve specific securities (e.g., 
the common stock of corporation X) or a specific type of 
security (e.g., common stock in general), must have been 
reached through the exercise of judgment.46 Thus, decisions and 
recommendations are not investment advice if they arise 
mechanically (e.g., from a computer program) and if the human 
inputs into the mechanical process are disregarded. However, 
the decisions and recommendations that constitute investment 
advice are not entirely unfettered because the securities involved 
in the advice are, or are to be, owned by another party. An 
adviser is an agent for a client who is investing in securities and, 
as agent, must act in line with restrictions that the client has 
imposed on the type(s) of securities that can be bought and 
sold.47 
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the 
instruments being purchased and sold are securities. Federal 
securities statutes do not identify the elements of a security but 
only list types of securities.48 Unfortunately, the referent of the 
word “security” is neither certain nor constant. Whether or not 
an instrument is a security is context-dependent, can differ 
between societies at a given point in time, and can change within 
a society over time.49 Nonetheless, widespread agreement seems 
to exist regarding one element of a security. In particular, the 
concept of a security connotes profit,50 and as a result, the 
decisions and recommendations of an investment adviser are 
primarily, if not solely, aimed at producing economic gain for 
                                                          
46 Id. 
47 See Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 233, 233–34 (1999). 
48 In the Advisers Act, the list of securities is in section 202(a)(18). 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).  
49 Social Productivity, supra note 41, at 829–31. 
50 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) (concluding that 
one criterion for whether an instrument is a security is whether the 
motivation for acquiring the instrument is profit); United Hous. Found, Inc. 
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975) (reasoning that profit has been an 
element in “all of the Court’s decisions defining a security”). 
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the clients of the adviser rather than change in social policies. 
How important are investment advisers in the economy of 
the United States? Surprisingly, hardly any data exist, but the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) has 
estimated that, in 2001, investment advisers in the United States 
had discretionary authority over client assets51 totaling nearly 
$19 trillion.52 This amount is large in absolute terms, of course, 
and it is large in relative terms, too.   
The relative size of the assets entrusted to investment 
                                                          
51 An investment adviser has discretion with regard to the account of a 
client (i) if the adviser has been authorized by the client to make decisions on 
the securities that are to be purchased and sold for the account of the client or 
(ii) if the adviser has been authorized by the client to employ the investment 
adviser(s) that will make these decisions. Securities & Exchange 
Commission, Uniform Application for Investment Advisor Registration, Form 
ADV, Glossary 2, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf. 
52 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,841, 60,841 
(Sept. 26, 2002). The estimate by the Commission is given only as a whole 
number, i.e., $19 trillion. In addition, the estimate is not explicitly stated to 
be for investment advisers registered with the Commission. Id. If the estimate 
omits advisers registered with states, the total assets being managed by all 
investment advisers nationwide would, of course, be larger. An investment 
adviser is required to register with the Commission if its “principal office and 
place of business” is in a state that does not regulate advisers or if it has as a 
client an investment company that is registered with the Commission. Any 
other investment adviser cannot register with the Commission unless it 
manages assets worth at least $25 million. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (2006). An 
investment adviser in a state that regulates advisers has the option of 
registering with the Commission if it manages assets of at least $25 million 
but less than $30 million, and such an investment adviser must register with 
the Commission if it manages assets worth $30 million or more. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.203A-1(a) (2009). 
Of the approximately $19 trillion being managed by investment advisers 
on a discretionary basis, according to the Release, roughly $7 trillion was in 
mutual funds. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 67 Fed. Reg. at 60,841 
n.2. The estimate of $19 trillion is presumably for 2001 (the calendar year 
prior to the Release), because at the end of 2001, the total net assets of 
mutual funds were $6.975 trillion. INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT 
COMPANY FACT BOOK 110 tbl.1 (49th ed. 2009), available at http://www. 
icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. The total net assets of mutual funds in 
2001 were thus very close to the figure for those assets (viz., $7 trillion) that 
is given in the Release. 
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advisers is illustrated by two economic yardsticks. The first is 
the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States.53 In 
2001, the year for which the Commission estimated the assets 
managed by investment advisers, the United States domestically 
produced goods and services worth over $10.1 trillion.54 
Consequently, the wealth controlled by investment advisers 
during 2001 was, in amount, more than 1.8 times the size of the 
GDP of the United States economy. Otherwise stated, the 
economy of the United States would have needed about 1.8 
years to generate the wealth over which investment advisers had 
discretionary management authority in 2001. 
GDP, however, may not be the most appropriate gauge of 
the relative importance of investment advisers in the economy of 
the United States. While the assets controlled by investment 
advisers and GDP are both monetary in nature, the former is a 
measure of financial resources that the United States has 
accumulated—in a sense, a nest egg of the country. GDP, on the 
other hand, is a measure of the output of the economy of a 
country in a single year from labor and property situated in the 
country. Comparing the two measures may be juxtaposing 
apples and oranges. 
One measure that may be more suitable for judging the 
societal significance of investment advisers is the current 
monetary value of fixed assets in the United States. Fixed assets 
are buildings (residential and non-residential), equipment, and 
                                                          
53 Gross domestic product (GDP) is “the total output of goods and 
services produced by labor and property located in the United States, valued 
at market prices.” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2008 425 (127th ed. 2007).  Gross national product (GNP), 
on the other hand, is “the output attributable to all labor and property 
supplied by United States residents.” Id. at 426. GDP is the output of labor 
and property that are within the United States; the labor and property may be 
that of residents of the United States or residents of other countries. Carol S. 
Carson, Replacing GNP: The Updated System of National Economic 
Accounts, BUS. ECON., July, 1992, at 44, 46. GNP is the output of the labor 
and property of residents of the United States, but the labor and property may 
be situated in any country. Id at 46. GDP has replaced GNP as the chief 
measure of economic production in the United States.  Id. at 44. 
54 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 53, at 429 tbl.645. 
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software of private parties and governments.55 Like assets 
managed by investment advisers, fixed assets constitute 
accumulated wealth, and a comparison of the two is thus likely 
to be more appropriate than a comparison of the assets managed 
by investment advisers and GDP. Moreover, the two measures 
do not overlap in the wealth they capture because they are 
different forms of wealth. Assets managed by investment 
advisers represent financial wealth; fixed assets represent 
nonfinancial wealth. 
In 2001, the market value of fixed assets in the United States 
was approximately $28.6 trillion.56 The wealth being managed 
on a discretionary basis by investment advisers was thus equal to 
about two-thirds of the wealth in fixed assets. Because fixed 
assets are composed of all buildings, equipment and software, 
they are central components of the level of affluence in the 
United States, and for every three dollars of fixed assets, there 
were two additional dollars under the discretionary management 
of investment advisers. 
Whichever yardstick is preferred—gross domestic product or 
fixed assets—it is clear that the occupation of investment adviser 
has become an important component of the financial sector of 
the United States. As the Commission has noted, “investment 
advisers play a key role in the economic life of America 
today.”57 However, securities and the society in which they trade 
are inextricably linked, and although the point is not often made 
explicitly, the occupation of investment adviser cannot be 
divorced from the society in which the occupation functions. As 
a result, the occupation has been a topic of legislation by 
                                                          
55 BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIXED 
ASSETS AND CONSUMER DURABLE GOODS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1925–97 
M-5 (2003), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/Fixed_Assets_ 
1925_97.pdf. 
56 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1. Current-Cost Net Stock of 
Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods, http://www.bea.gov/national/ 
FA2004/SelectTable.asp (follow “Table 1.1 Current-Cost Net Stock of Fixed 
Assets and Consumer Durable Goods” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 
2010).  
57 Investment Adviser Year 2000 Reports, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1339, at *4. 
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Congress and, pursuant to the legislation, subject to oversight by 
the Commission. 
B. Investment Advisers Act 
Important federal legislation dealing with securities was not 
enacted in the United States until the economic depression of the 
1930s.58 In 1933, Congress passed the first piece of legislation, 
the Securities Act,59 and a year later adopted the Securities 
Exchange Act.60 In 1940, Congress approved the Investment 
Advisers Act61 and the Investment Company Act.62 These four 
statutes supply most of the foundation for the regulation of 
securities and the securities industry in the United States today. 
Of the four statutes, however, we will be concerned with just 
one—the Investment Advisers Act (“Advisers Act”). 
As shown above,63 the occupation of investment adviser is 
currently of major significance to the financial sector in the 
United States, but the salience of the occupation is not recent. 
Investment advisers became a noticeable feature of the sector 
initially during the 1930s.64 The expansion of the occupation at 
this time has been attributed to the volatility of stock prices that 
started in the latter half of 192965 and that caused investors to be 
                                                          
58 Mindy Olson, Note, The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor 
Restitution Act: More Effective Than Current Regulation?, 30 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 425, 427–28 (2005). 
59 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-3 (2006)). 
60 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
(1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78oo (2006)). 
61 Investment Advisers Act, ch. 686, title II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006)). The 
Investment Advisers Act took effect on November 1, 1940. Id. at title II, 
§ 221, 54 Stat. 857 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-21 (2006)). 
62 Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006)). 
63 See supra Part II.A. 
64 S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 21 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 27 
(1940). 
65 A chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on each trading day from 
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wary of long-term commitments to constant sets of securities.66 
Although the exact monetary value of assets managed by 
investment advisers in the 1930s is unknown, the amount under 
management was believed by Congress to be sufficiently large to 
warrant enactment of a statute—the Advisers Act—authorizing 
regulation of the occupation by the federal government.67 In 
writing the Act, therefore, Congress not surprisingly 
incorporated an explicit statement that the impact of the 
occupation on the economy in general and the financial sector in 
particular had been nationwide in scope and material in degree.68 
1. Statutory Definition 
Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, stripped of its 
statutory exclusions,69 defines an investment adviser as: 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the 
business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or 
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part 
                                                          
January 1920 through December 1939 is available at http://stockcharts. 
com/charts/historical/djia19201940.html. 
66 H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477, at 5 (1939); Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies, Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on 
Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. 1004 (1940) (statement of Research Dep’t, 
Ill. Legis. Council), available at HeinOnline, U.S. Federal Legislative 
History Library. A study of financial markets has ascribed the shift from 
passive to active management of securities portfolios, and the adoption of the 
techniques currently used to reduce risk in securities portfolios, to the 
volatility of stock prices during the 1970s and to the investment in securities 
of large sums by entities at that time. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: 
THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 7–9 (1992). A chart of 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average on each trading day from January 1960 
through December 1980 is available at http://stockcharts.com/charts/ 
historical/djia19601980.html. 
67 S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 27 
(1940). 
68 Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2006)). 
69 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A)-(G). 
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of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or 
reports concerning securities.70 
The above definition (“statutory definition”), like any law 
that is designed to achieve breadth, employs concepts of general 
application. Given this generality and the resulting ambiguities 
in the statutory definition, the staff of the Commission has found 
it necessary to publish two interpretations of the definition.71 The 
initial interpretation appeared in 1981,72 but a second 
interpretation—Release No. IA-1092—superseded it in 1987, 
i.e., just six years later.73  Because Release No. IA-1092 is 
important to understanding the statutory definition of investment 
adviser, a review of pertinent portions of the Release is 
warranted.  
2. Release No. IA-1092 
According to Release IA-1092, a person is an investment 
advisor for purposes of the Advisers Act if all of the following 
conditions exist: 
(i)  The person furnishes advice, reports, or analyses that 
deal with securities; 
                                                          
70 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11). A “person” can be a human being or an entity. Id. 
§ 80b-2(a)(5), -2(a)(16). 
71 The interpretations are those of the staff of the Division of Investment 
Management. Id. The current structure of the Commission includes five 
Divisions and eighteen Offices. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Division and Offices 
Homepages, http://www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
The Division of Investment Management is responsible for construing the 
Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act. See Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Division of Investment Management, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
investment.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
72 Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as an Integral Component of Other Financial Related Services, 46 
Fed. Reg. 41,771 (Aug. 18, 1981). 
73 Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400 
(Oct. 16, 1987). 
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(ii)  The services in (i) constitute a business;74 and 
(iii) The services in (i) are supplied for compensation.75 
An additional condition, however, is embedded in (i). While 
the additional condition is not expressly addressed by the 
Release, it is basic to the statutory definition of investment 
adviser. The condition, which arises from the construction of the 
Advisers Act by the United States Supreme Court,76 recognizes 
that advice, reports, and analyses regarding securities—the 
services in (i)—can be of different types. For a person to qualify 
as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act, however, the 
person needs to provide a particular type of service. 
Specifically, 
(iv) The services in (i) must involve individualized 
treatment of the recipient of the services. 
Thus, if the services do not take into account the financial and 
psychological profile of the person receiving the services—i.e., 
if the services are not tailored to the recipient—the person 
delivering the advice, reports or analyses will not be an 
investment adviser.77 
It is unfortunate that condition (iv) is not discussed in 
                                                          
74 The statutory definition, which is reproduced in the text accompanying 
note 70 supra, seems to cover two distinct types of business activity that 
differ in, inter alia, frequency. HAAS & HOWARD, supra note 45, at 13. One 
type entails a “business” of providing advice on securities; the other type 
entails a “regular business” of providing analyses or reports on securities.  15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). However, the staff has taken the position that the two 
references to business in section 202(a)(11) apply to just a single type of 
activity. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. at 
38,402. 
75 Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. at 
38,402. 
76 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
77 Id. at 207–08 (“The Act was designed to apply to those persons . . . 
who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns, whether by 
written or verbal communication.”). 
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Release IA-1092.78 An in-depth discussion of this condition 
would have probably suggested indicators of the presence or 
absence of individualized treatment under the Advisers Act. In 
doing so, the discussion would have underscored the prominence 
of individualism in the culture of the United States.79 
Individualism, often a concomitant or component of privacy, is 
manifested in doctrines of U.S. law on a variety of topics, 
including employment discrimination,80 immigration,81 
pornography,82 sexuality and reproduction,83 and violent crime.84 
Individualism also forms a cornerstone of U.S. law on 
securities,85 and its appearance in the Advisers Act, therefore, 
should not be unexpected. 
Condition (iv), however, is not alone in having relevance to 
the macrosociological framework of this article. Conditions 
(ii) and (iii) are pertinent, too. With regard to (ii)—which 
focuses on the business element of the statutory definition—the 
Release concludes that a person is engaged in the business of 
being an investment adviser if the person makes public 
representations that the person is an investment adviser, if the 
person receives identifiable compensation that is linked to 
furnishing advice on securities, or if the person other than 
sporadically provides clients with recommendations, analyses or 
                                                          
78 The Release, in answering question (i), refers to a recipient of the 
services as a client. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial 
Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment 
Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 
38,400, 38,402 (Oct. 16, 1987). The Release, accordingly, may have 
implicitly recognized question (iv) and incorporated the position of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Lowe. 
79 Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1526 (2005) 
(finding with data from the World Values Survey that, among twenty-five 
countries, the United States had the highest level of individualism). 
80 See The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 631–35. 
81 E.g., McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1960). 
82 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
83 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1972). 
84 E.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
85 Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of 
Ethics and Risk in Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 486 (2003). 
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reports focusing on particular securities or particular types of 
securities.86 Because the Release separates these conditions with 
the word “or,” it contemplates that any one of the conditions 
will suffice to create a business under the Advisers Act.87 
The Release, of course, is an interpretation of a statute by an 
administrative agency, and as such, it is not binding on the 
judiciary.88 If Congress has not defined a word in a statute, 
federal courts rather than federal executive-branch agencies are 
the ultimate arbiters of the meaning of the word.89 Notably, 
neither the Advisers Act itself90 nor the legislative history of the 
Act91 supplies a definition of the word “business.” To date, 
moreover, no federal court seems to have departed from the 
Release when interpreting the word “business” in the Advisers 
Act definition of investment adviser, but inasmuch as the 
judiciary is not compelled to follow the Release, the judiciary 
may eventually assign to the word “business” the meaning that 
was generally accepted in the United States when the Advisers 
Act was adopted.92 Indeed, the meaning of the word “business” 
to the public at the time the statutory definition was incorporated 
into the Advisers Act may be preferred by the judiciary93 
inasmuch as Congress has not altered the definition since 
                                                          
86 Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers 
Act, 52 Fed. Reg. at 38,402. 
87 Id. 
88 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations 
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983). 
89 See Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 182–84 (2004). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (2006). 
91 S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 20-22 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 27–
28 (1940). 
92 See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); 2A NORMAN J. 
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 123–24 (6th ed. 2000). 
93 Bedroc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 184. In ascertaining the referents of three 
words in a section of the Securities Exchange Act, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has relied on a dictionary published in the year the Act was adopted by 
Congress. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20, 21 (1976). 
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formulating it in 1940.94 
A reason for believing that the general understanding of the 
word “business” in 1940 comports more fully with 
congressional intent than the criteria for the existence of a 
business95 that were developed by the staff of the Commission is 
that the two Releases were issued by the staff in the 1980s. The 
Advisers Act, however, was adopted by Congress in 1940, four 
decades  earlier. Because the Releases reflect social and 
economic conditions at the time they were written, their criteria 
for a business cannot be blindly accepted. On the contrary, their 
criteria should be approached with some skepticism. 
If the judiciary were to construe the word “business” in 
accordance with the way the word was employed in public 
discourse when Congress approved the Advisers Act, what 
would be the meaning of the word? According to two 
dictionaries published in the first half of the 1930s, a period 
close to the year (1940) in which the Act was adopted, 
“business” includes: 
“Any particular occupation or employment habitually 
engaged in, esp. for livelihood or gain.”96 
“12. A person’s official or professional duties as a 
whole; stated occupation, profession, or trade. 13. In 
general sense: Action which occupies time, demands 
attention and labour; esp. serious occupation, work, as 
opposed to pleasure or recreation . . . . 14.b. A 
                                                          
94 Compare Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, title II, 
§ 202(a)(11), 54 Stat. 847, 848 (1940) with 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). 
95 The criteria can be found in Applicability of the Investment Advisers 
Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons who 
Provide Investment Advisory Services as an Integral Component of Other 
Financial Related Services, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,771, 41,772–73 (Aug. 18, 1981) 
and in Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400, 
38,402–03 (Oct. 16, 1987). 
96 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 296–97 (1932) (def. 2.b). 
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particular occupation; a trade or profession.”97 
To combine the above, a business is a recurring,98 profit-
seeking activity of a person (human being or entity). In addition, 
the society in which the activity occurs must identify the activity 
as a business rather than as a form of relaxation or a means of 
amusement. A business, consequently, has the purpose of 
obtaining an economic return and is an activity that society 
classifies as a business. 
The preceding composite of the dictionary meanings 
(“composite”), however, is at variance with the position taken 
by the Release. In this regard, two of the factors listed in the 
Release are pertinent. First, public representations by a person 
that the person is an investment adviser suffice to put the person 
into business as an investment adviser.99 Second, the receipt of 
compensation for furnishing advice on securities is enough to 
cause a person to be in business as an investment adviser.100 
According to the Release, either factor by itself creates a 
business.101 
Unlike the Release, the composite of the dictionary 
definitions does not allow any one factor to cause an activity to 
be a business. Under the composite, a person would be in the 
business of being an investment adviser only if the person 
actually furnished clients with advice, reports, or analyses 
dealing with securities; if the person did so repeatedly (i.e., on a 
regular basis); and if the person expected or accepted a 
monetary payment for these activities. To illustrate the 
composite, a company that publicly portrays itself as an 
investment adviser would not be in the investment adviser 
business unless it actually has clients and serves them as an 
investment adviser. Similarly, an individual would not be in the 
                                                          
97 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1205 (1933). 
98 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 
3, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defining words in a section of the Investment 
Company Act and observing that the word “‘Business’ implies continued 
activity”), aff’d, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970). 
99 Supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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investment adviser business under the composite simply because 
he or she is paid, or expects to be paid, a sum of money for 
acting as an investment adviser to a single client on a single 
occasion. If the position adopted in the Release is used, on the 
other hand, both the company and the individual would be in the 
investment adviser business. 
Before leaving the composite, a final point merits emphasis. 
Under the composite, a necessary condition for an activity to be 
designated a business is that the society in which the activity 
takes place must label the activity as a business rather than as 
entertainment. However, a society has latitude in how it 
classifies and deals with phenomena. Thus, a society may 
consider a particular activity to be unacceptable, as in the case 
of prostitution, and when it does so, it will attempt to eliminate 
the activity through informal means and/or through law.102 On 
the other hand, a society may not be cognizant of or concerned 
with the impact of a phenomenon that is materially affecting it. 
An illustration is the size and continuing growth of population, a 
topic that is relevant to the content of law because population 
density shapes law.103 In recent decades, the population of the 
world has been increasing by more than three-quarters of a 
billion people every ten years,104 but the ramifications of 
population growth in the United States105 and elsewhere for 
                                                          
102 As of 2006, prostitution was unlawful in every state of the United 
States except in certain counties of Nevada and except in certain 
circumstances in Rhode Island. Lauren M. Davis, Prostitution, 7 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 835, 836–37 (2006). 
103 E.g., Kenneth D. Wald et al., The Politics of Gay Rights in American 
Communities: Explaining Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies, 40 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 1152 (1996). 
104 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TOTAL MIDYEAR POPULATION FOR THE 
WORLD: 1950–2050 (2009), http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop. 
php.  The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the population of the world was 
4.3 billion in 1978 and 6.7 billion in 2008. Id. 
105  The resident population of the United States, according to the 
decennial census, was 151.3 million in April 1950 and 281.4 million in April 
2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 53, at 7 tbl.1. The U.S. resident 
population is estimated to have been 307.0 million on July 1, 2009. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR 
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economic prosperity and social stability106 are not currently 
attracting much attention among Americans.107 
The way in which a phenomenon is perceived by a society, 
in short, does not depend solely on the nature of the 
phenomenon. It is also a function of societal conditions, 
including the cultural dimensions of social life, and in this sense, 
the problems that confront a society are socially constructed.108 
For the Advisers Act, the social character of societal 
designations means that whether a particular undertaking is 
deemed to be a “business”—and, as discussed infra, whether the 
undertaking is “for compensation” and whether an item is 
compensation—depends on circumstances in the society that 
hosts the undertaking. Unfortunately, the sociological variables 
bearing on whether an activity is considered to be the business 
of investment advising are unknown and will remain so until 
they have been the subject of rigorous research. 
Finally, we consider condition (iii)—the compensation 
element—in the statutory definition of investment adviser. While 
the condition does not require a lengthy exploration, two points 
should be made. First, insofar as compensation is economic in 
nature—a position that seems to be taken by the Release109—it is 
                                                          
THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO 
JULY 1, 2009 (2009), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html. 
106 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR 
SUCCEED 6–7 (2005) (finding that human population growth was a factor 
causing the disappearance of societies in the past). 
107 Derek Seabury Hoff, Are We Too Many? The Population Debate and 
Policymaking in the Twentieth-Century United States 10-12 (Jan. 2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with 
Widener University Library). The present failure to address the problem of 
U.S. population growth also characterizes scholarship on law. A notable 
exception is Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2007). 
108 Joseph W. Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist 
View, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 209, 210–12 (1985) (examining social problems as 
societal constructs). 
109 Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, 
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory 
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400, 
38,403 (Oct. 16, 1987); HAAS & HOWARD, supra note 45, at 16. 
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a component of a business, which is condition (ii).110 Thus, when 
compensation is economic, its treatment as a separate element is 
unnecessary.111 
The second point involves the matter of whether all 
compensation is economic. In this regard, it is pertinent that 
section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act forbids a person 
who is affiliated with a Commission-registered investment 
company from accepting non-salary or non-wage compensation 
for selling property to, or buying property from, the investment 
company if, in the transaction, the affiliated person is an 
agent.112 Notably, section 17(e)(1) is part of a statute that was a 
companion to the Advisers Act,113 and both in section 17(e)(1) 
and in section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, Congress 
                                                          
110 Supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
111 The Release raises a further point when, in discussing the 
compensation element, it refers to “the receipt of any economic benefit,” to 
whether a “fee is charged,” and to whether compensation is “paid.” 
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension 
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services 
as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed. Reg. at 38,403. The 
statutory definition of investment adviser requires only that covered activities 
be “for compensation.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006) (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the compensation element of the statutory definition is 
probably satisfied not only by a receipt/payment of compensation but also by 
an expectation of compensation. Whether such an expectation is present in a 
situation undoubtedly depends in part on social convention and culture. 
112 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (2006). The wording of section 17(e)(1) has 
not been amended since the Investment Company Act was adopted in 1940. 
Compare Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, § 17(e)(1), 54 Stat. 789, 
816 (1940) with 15 U.S.C. § 17(e)(1) (2006).  Section 17(e)(1) covers both a 
“first-tier” affiliated person (i.e., a person affiliated with a registered 
investment company) and a “second-tier” affiliated person (i.e., a person 
affiliated with a first-tier affiliated person). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1). 
“Affiliated person” is defined in section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company 
Act. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3) (2006). 
113 The Investment Company Act and the Advisers Act were included in 
Public Law No. 76-768. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 
Stat. 789 (1940); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, 54 Stat. 
847 (1940). The stated purpose of Public Law No. 76-768 was inter alia “[t]o 
provide for the registration and regulation of investment companies and 
investment advisers . . . .” 54 Stat. at 789.   
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incorporated compensation as an element. Neither piece of 
legislation defines the word “compensation,” but inasmuch as 
the two statutes were adopted together, Congress is unlikely to 
have wanted the word to be defined in one way in the 
Investment Company Act and in a different way in the Advisers 
Act. 
Because an affiliate of an investment company includes the 
investment adviser to the company,114 section 17(e)(1) covers 
investment advisers to registered investment companies.115 Under 
existing case law, an item is compensation under section 
17(e)(1) as long as the item is thought to be a benefit by the 
person accepting it,116 i.e., the attractiveness of an item to a 
person determines whether, for that person, the item constitutes 
compensation. Of course, while an item may be attractive for an 
economic reason, it may also be attractive for a reason that is 
not economic. Therefore, an item would apparently qualify as 
compensation under section 17(e)(1) even if it has no significant 
economic (e.g., monetary) value as long as it has significant 
psychological (e.g., emotional) value or significant social (e.g., 
reputational) value to the person who wants or receives it.117 
                                                          
114 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(E) (2006).  The adviser is a first-tier 
affiliated person of the investment company. Id. 
115 Officers, employees, and directors of an investment adviser are 
affiliated with the investment adviser. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (2006). As first-
tier affiliated persons of the investment adviser, they are second-tier affiliated 
persons of an investment company that is served by the adviser. Section 
17(e)(1) covers both first-tier and second-tier affiliated persons of a registered 
investment company. Supra note 112. Consequently, if an investment 
company is registered with the Commission, section 17(e)(1) applies not only 
to its investment adviser but also to the officers, employees, and directors of 
the adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1). 
116 United States v. Ostrander, 999 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1993).   
117 Ostrander, 999 F.2d at 31. This conclusion, which is derived from 
case law, is consistent with definitions of “compensation” in dictionaries 
published shortly before the Investment Company Act was adopted. The 
Investment Company Act was enacted in 1940, as was the Advisers Act.  Ch. 
686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 & title II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940). Definitions in a 
contemporary dictionary are evidence of the meaning of words in a statute. 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 & nn.20, 21 (1976). 
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Assuming that Congress wanted the word “compensation” to 
have the same meaning in section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act 
as it has in section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act, a 
person could become an investment adviser either from 
compensation that is economic or from compensation that is not 
economic. If this conclusion is correct—i.e., if compensation 
under section 202(a)(11) can be economic or non-economic—the 
statutory definition of investment adviser fits comfortably within 
a macrosociological framework. For example, the relative appeal 
of money versus an item other than money evidently varies 
across subcultures within a society,118 and the relative appeal of 
one type of non-money item versus another is almost certainly a 
function of culture, too.119 If these propositions are correct, the 
                                                          
LANGUAGE 455, 1784 (1932) defines “compensation” to include “[t]hat 
which constitutes, or is regarded as, an equivalent or recompense,” and 
defines “recompense” as a noun to encompass “[a]n equivalent returned for 
anything done, suffered, or given.” A synonym listed for “compensation” 
and for “recompense” is “reward.” Id. Accord, 2 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 717 (1933) (definitions 1 and 2 of “compensation); 8 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 259 (1933) (definition 3 of “recompense” in its 
substantive sense). Under the foregoing definitions, compensation can be non-
economic. 
118  See R. L. Stirrat, Money, Men and Women, in MONEY AND THE 
MORALITY OF EXCHANGE 94, 98–99 (J. Parry & M. Bloch eds., 1989) 
(describing differences between women and men in money-related views and 
behavior in a village in Sri Lanka). Cf. Celia J. Falicov, The Cultural 
Meanings of Money: The Case of Latinos and Anglo-Americans, 45 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 313, 314, 321, 326 (2001) (contending that social 
considerations, especially ties within nuclear and extended families, are more 
important as incentives to working-class Latinos in the United States than to 
middle-class Anglo-Americans and that the uses of money accordingly differ 
between the two subcultures). See generally Maurice Bloch & Jonathan 
Parry, Introduction: Money and the Morality of Exchange, in MONEY AND 
THE MORALITY OF EXCHANGE, supra, at 1, 1 (concluding from 
anthropological studies that the way money is viewed and used is not the 
same in all cultures); Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money: 
“Special Monies,” 95 AM. J. SOCIOL. 342, 351 (1989) (contending that the 
uses, users, allocation, and sources of money in a society are affected by 
culture and social structure). 
119 Cf. Stacey Menzel Baker et al., From Despicable to Collectible: The 
Evolution of Collective Memories for and the Value of Black Advertising 
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issue of whether a person satisfies the compensation element (as 
well as other elements) of the statutory definition of investment 
adviser is not determined by factors internal to the institution of 
law but by factors external to the institution. The latter factors 
can be expected to include mainly macrosociological variables. 
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ANTECEDENTS OF LAW 
A premise of this article is that law does not arise randomly 
but is anchored in society. Under this view, the concepts and 
doctrines of law that are central to a society are not attributable 
to individuals and personalities, but are explained instead by 
sociological, demographic, and/or economic conditions in the 
society. However, the premise requires appreciably more 
empirical support than it currently possesses.120 Relevant 
evidence seems likely to be produced by research on the societal 
factors that may lie behind the conditions that are the immediate 
antecedents shaping regulatory law (i.e., law designed to 
suppress or encourage a particular type of activity). If a factor 
that potentially affects an immediate antecedent of regulatory 
law can be measured quantitatively, a multivariate statistical test 
                                                          
Memorabilia, 33 J. ADVERTISING 37 (2004) (describing a type of item whose 
appeal changed over time in the United States). See generally Geert Hofstede 
& Robert R. McCrae, Personality and Culture Revisited: Linking Traits and 
Dimensions of Culture, 38 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 52, 62–64, 79 (2004) 
(finding that differences in culture are associated with differences in 
personality and hypothesizing that the former produce the latter). 
120 The most persuasive of the empirical studies that support the premise 
are summarized in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological 
Framework, supra note 22, at 11–13. A recently published study has found 
that higher rates of homicide in U.S. counties lower the probability that 
defendants charged with homicide will be convicted; for defendants who are 
convicted, higher rates of homicide shorten the prison terms imposed. Mark 
Cooney & Callie Harbin Burt, Less Crime, More Punishment, 114 AM. J. 
SOCIOL. 491 (2008). Homicide, accordingly, seems to be undeterred by 
punishment through the institution of law, i.e., by conviction and 
imprisonment. Id. at 494–95, 514. This finding is consistent with the 
evidence from social science research that, in a society, patterns of social 
activity materially affect, but are not materially affected by, the institution of 
law. Supra note 20. 
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can ascertain whether the factor is related to the antecedent and 
can estimate the strength of any relationship found. 
In Part II supra, I examined federal law on the occupation of 
investment adviser as an example of regulation by government. 
This law and the occupation it regulates were intended to be a 
case study, and the regulation of investment advisers was 
reviewed on the assumption that law concerned with one type of 
activity can lead to an understanding of the antecedents of 
regulatory law on multiple types of activity that are important to 
society. Notably, the Advisers Act embodies a concern with 
morality,121 a concern whose presence in the Act should not be 
surprising since law generally is grounded in morality.122 Any 
factor that molds morality, therefore, is likely to help in 
explaining the development and disappearance of law-based 
regulation directed at the many activities in a society that are 
tied to morality. 
In this Part of the article, I present an analysis of 
quantitative data that was undertaken to identify factors that may 
affect whether morality is classified by adults in the United 
States as a public issue or a private matter. Because law in a 
democracy eventually incorporates prevailing morality, law and 
morality cannot be divorced. However, the assignment of a 
morality-linked form of behavior to the public sphere or to the 
private sphere is critical to the presence or absence of regulatory 
law addressing such behavior. The factors that are responsible 
for defining morally relevant behavior as public or private thus 
potentially account for whether law exists to regulate the 
behavior. 
The data that I analyzed are from the General Social Survey 
(“GSS”). The GSS, which began in 1972, annually or biennially 
samples adults residing in the United States and, through face-
to-face interviews, gathers information on a wide range of 
topics. The topics covered by the GSS, however, are not 
identical in every survey.  The data for the instant study are 
                                                          
121 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963). 
122 Don Welch, The State As a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 540, 542–43, 549 (1988). 
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from the GSS that was conducted in 1991 because of the set of 
variables measured in that year. The 1991 GSS used multi-stage 
cluster sampling to choose blocks of dwelling units and then, 
within chosen blocks, quota sampling to select individuals. In 
1991, the GSS was confined to English-speaking residents.123 
A. Variables 
The dependent variable—the phenomenon that I sought to 
explain—was derived from responses to two questions in the 
1991 GSS that focus on a fundamental dimension of social life, 
and I therefore regard the responses as measures of values rather 
than of opinions.124 The GSS assigns mnemonic labels to its 
variables, and the labels for the two questions that formed the 
basis of the dependent variable in my study were PERRIGHT and 
SOCRIGHT. The wording of each question is reproduced in Table 
1, and as is evident from their wording, both questions dealt 
with morality. In the sociology of law, morality and the factors 
that affect it are important subjects for research because different 
views of morality are central to divisive issues facing 
government125 and because law will not usually regulate an 
activity in a democratic society unless the society considers the 
activity to be immoral126 and public.127 Although PERRIGHT and 
                                                          
123 NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–
2008: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 2188 (2009), http://www.norc.org/GSS+ 
Website/Documentation (follow “Final 2008 GSS Codebook” hyperlink). 
124 Social values and opinions are defined and distinguished as concepts 
in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra note 
22, at 14. 
125 Christopher Z. Mooney & Richard G. Schuldt, Does Morality Policy 
Exist? Testing a Basic Assumption, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 199, 204 tbl.1, 209 
tbl.5, 210 & tbl.6 (2008). 
126 The United States Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he law . . . is 
constantly based on notions of morality.”  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 196 (1986). The holding in Bowers—that a statute prohibiting private 
same-sex sexual relations is not unconstitutional—was overruled seventeen 
years later in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). However, the 
Court in Bowers was not incorrect in writing that the substance of morality 
shapes the doctrines of law. Following the decision in Bowers in 1986, the 
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SOCRIGHT concentrated on morality in general rather than on the 
morality of a specific type of behavior, the general is likely to 
inform the specific, and the antecedents of morality in its 
generic form can be expected to offer insight into the content of 
law at a particular time and change in law over time. 
Respondents who agreed with PERRIGHT and disagreed with 
SOCRIGHT were assumed to consider morality a private matter; 
conversely, respondents who disagreed with PERRIGHT and 
agreed with SOCRIGHT were assumed to view morality as a 
public issue.128 To capture the dimension that links PERRIGHT and 
SOCRIGHT, a new variable was created, and on the new variable, 
the former respondents were coded 1 and the latter respondents 
were coded 0. The new variable was labeled MORALITY and was 
used in the regression model as the dependent variable. 
Respondents who could not be coded 1 or 0 on MORALITY—e.g., 
respondents who agreed both with PERRIGHT and with 
SOCRIGHT—were omitted from the analysis. As a result, the use 
of MORALITY as the dependent variable imposed on the data 
                                                          
belief that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable alternative 
lifestyle” became increasingly frequent among adults in the United States, 
and by 1999, a slight majority held this belief. Public Agenda, Acceptance of 
Homosexuality Has Grown Significantly, http://www.publicagenda.org/ 
charts/acceptance-homosexuality-has-grown-significantly-0 (last visited Feb. 
14, 2010). Morality has been defined as the “conduct conforming to the 
customs or accepted standards of a particular culture or group.” WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1469 (3d ed. 1993). As so defined, 
the state of morality at the time of Lawrence forms a foundation of the 
holding of the Supreme Court in the case.  
127 See Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, 
supra note 22, at 15–18. 
128 Interviewees whose response was “strongly agree” or “agree” were 
classified as having agreed; interviewees whose response was “disagree” or 
“strongly disagree” were classified as having disagreed. 
PERRIGHT was answered by 1,287 interviewees, 315 of whom stated 
that they “neither agree nor disagree” or that they “don’t know.”  SOCRIGHT 
was answered by 1,282 interviewees, 368 of whom stated that they “neither 
agree nor disagree” or that they “don’t know.” Calculated from NAT’L 
OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 1812. A total of 638 
interviewees gave one of the foregoing answers to PERRIGHT and/or to 
SOCRIGHT. These 638 interviewees were not included in the data analysis. 
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analysis a ceiling of 305 respondents, of whom 145 were coded 
1 and 160 were coded 0. 
Table 1. Variables in Regression Model129 
 
Mnemonic label 
of GSS question 
 
 
Measurement of variable
 
Dependent 
variable: 
MORALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Components of 
MORALITY: 
PERRIGHT 
 
 
 
 
SOCRIGHT 
 
 
 
 
MORALITY was measured as a dummy 
variable (i.e., respondents were coded 0 or 
1) based on the answers to PERRIGHT and 
SOCRIGHT. Respondents who disagreed with 
PERRIGHT and agreed with SOCRIGHT were 
coded 0 on MORALITY. Respondents who 
agreed with PERRIGHT and disagreed with 
SOCRIGHT were coded 1 on MORALITY. 
 
 
 
“Do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements . . . . Right and wrong 
should be a matter of personal conscience.” 
(GSS question #1530C.) 
 
“Do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements . . . . Right and wrong 
should be decided by society.” (GSS 
question #1530B.) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129 The question numbers shown in the table are from NAT’L OPINION 
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123. 
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Independent 
variables: 
AGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BORN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDUC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FATALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age of the respondent in years. (GSS 
question #13.) In the data analysis, AGE was 
a variable with three categories. Respondents 
who were eighteen to forty-four years of age 
were coded 1; respondents who were forty-
five to sixty-four years of age were coded 2; 
and respondents who were sixty-five years of 
age or older were coded 3. 
 
“Were you born in this country?” (GSS 
question #31.) In the data analysis, BORN was 
a dummy variable. Respondents who 
answered “yes” were coded 0, and 
respondents who answered “no” were coded 
1. 
 
The number of years of formal schooling that 
a respondent reported she or he had 
completed. (GSS question #15.) In the data 
analysis, EDUC was a dummy variable. 
Respondents who had finished no more than 
twelve years of schooling were coded 0, and 
respondents who had finished at least thirteen 
years of schooling were coded 1. 
 
“Do you agree or disagree with the 
following . . . There is little that people can 
do to change the course of their lives.” (GSS 
question #1517B.) In the data analysis, 
FATALISM was a dummy variable. 
Respondents were coded 0 if they answered 
“strongly agree” or “agree,” and they were 
coded 1 if they answered “disagree” or 
“strongly disagree.” 
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PRAYFREQ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RACE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REALINC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEX 
 
 
 
 
TRUST 
 
“Now thinking about the present, about how 
often do you pray?” (GSS question #1526.) 
In the data analysis, PRAYFREQ was a 
variable with three categories. Respondents 
were coded 1 if they reported praying 
“never,” “less than once a year,” “about 
once or twice a year,” or “several times a 
year.” Respondents were coded 2 if they 
reported praying “about once a month,” 
“two to three times a month,” “nearly every 
week,” “every week,” or “several times a 
week.” Respondents were coded 3 if they 
reported praying “once a day” or “several 
times a day.” 
 
Race of the respondent as reported by the 
respondent. (GSS question #24.) In the data 
analysis, RACE was a dummy variable. 
Respondents who reported that they were 
“White” were coded 0, and respondents who 
reported that they were “Black” were coded 
1. 
 
Family income of the respondent in constant 
(1986) dollars. (GSS question #1738.) In the 
data analysis, REALINC was a dummy 
variable. Respondents were coded 0 if their 
family income was less than $20,000 and 
were coded 1 if their family income was 
$20,000 or more. 
 
Sex of the respondent. (GSS question #23.) 
In the data analysis, SEX was a dummy 
variable. Males were coded 0, and females 
were coded 1. 
 
“Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
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XNORCSIZ 
 
be too careful in life.” (GSS question 
#163A.) In the data analysis, TRUST was a 
dummy variable. Respondents who believed 
that “most people can be trusted” were 
coded 0, and respondents who believed that 
“you can’t be too careful” were coded 1. 
 
Level of urbanization of the place of 
residence of the respondent. (GSS question 
52B.) In the data analysis, XNORCSIZ was a 
variable with three categories. Respondent’s 
place of residence was coded 1 if it was “not 
within an SMSA, (within a county)” and was 
one of the following: “open country within 
larger civil divisions,” “an incorporated area 
less than 2,500 or an unincorporated area of 
1,000 to 2,499,” “a town or village (2,500 
to 9,999),” or “a small city (10,000 to 
49,999).” Respondent’s place of residence 
was coded 2 if it was “within an SMSA” and 
was one of the following: “an unincorporated 
area of a medium central city,” “an 
unincorporated area of a large central city 
(division, township, etc.),” “a suburb of a 
medium size central city,” or “a suburb of a 
large central city.” Respondent’s place of 
residence was coded 3 if it was “within an 
SMSA” and was one of the following: “a 
medium size central city (50,000 to 
250,000)” or “a large central city (over 
250,000).” SMSA is the acronym for a 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
 
 
What variables (“independent variables”) are promising as 
explanations of the dependent variable in the instant study? The 
combination of already published research on the antecedents of 
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law on specific topics,130 other pertinent social science 
research,131 and existing law on investment advisers132 suggest 
two sets of independent variables. One set structures (e.g., 
stratifies) a societal system, and the other set is comprised of 
dimensions of its culture.133 Table 1 presents the variables in the 
two sets, the questions in the 1991 GSS that were used for the 
variables, and the manner in which each variable was measured 
in the instant study. A maximum of three categories were 
employed for an independent variable because, as discussed 
infra in Part III.B., the number of respondents in the data 
analysis was relatively small. Three-category independent 
variables were assumed to be interval scales.134 
                                                          
130 A summary of the most credible of these studies is in Public-Private 
Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra note 22, at 11–13. 
131 JAMES A. DAVIS, BACKGROUND VARIABLES AND OPINIONS IN THE 
1972-1977 NORC GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS: TEN GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT 
AGE, EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE, RACE, RELIGION, AND SEX, 
AND FORTY-NINE OPINION ITEMS (1979), http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/ 
gss/DOCUMENTS/REPORTS/Topical_Reports/TR02.pdf. 
132 Supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
133 In the instant article, the word “culture” refers to the fundamental 
assumptions that shape the perceptions and behavior of the members of a 
society. Edgar H. Schein, Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization 
Studies, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 236 (1996). 
134 An explanation of scale types—nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio—
is in Anwer Khurshid & Hardeo Sahai, Scales of Measurements: An 
Introduction and a Selected Bibliography, 27 QUALITY & QUANTITY 303, 
304–05, 308–10 (1993). Although the scale types have been clearly defined, 
universal agreement is lacking on the criteria for determining the scale type 
of a particular measurement procedure. Id. at 311–12. Moreover, evidence 
exists that, when three or more ordered categories are used to measure an 
independent variable, the advantages of treating the categories as an interval 
scale (rather than an ordinal scale) outweigh the disadvantages. Sanford 
Labovitz, The Assignment of Numbers to Rank Order Categories, 35 AM. 
SOCIOL. REV. 515 (1970); Mark Traylor, Ordinal and Interval Scaling, 25 J. 
MARKET RES. SOC’Y 297 (1983). In general, then, three or more ordered 
categories should be considered an interval scale unless there is a specific 
reason for using them as an ordinal scale. 
In analyzing data, a reference category is needed for an independent 
variable that is measured with an ordinal scale. J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY 
FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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For the first set of independent variables—i.e., the structural 
variables—the regression equation included factors that have 
been significant in organizing the societal system in the United 
States. Each of the variables, accordingly, has important social 
correlates and consequences. The variables were the 
respondent’s age (AGE),135 educational attainment (EDUC), 
national origin (BORN), race (RACE), family income (REALINC), 
and sex (SEX) as well as the degree of urbanization of the area 
where the respondent resided (XNORCSIZ). Because of their 
importance in society, structural features such as the foregoing 
have traditionally been the core of the discipline of sociology136 
and cannot be ignored in any effort to explain social values that 
differentiate private from public in morality as an antecedent of 
regulatory law. 
The second set of independent variables in the regression 
                                                          
USING STATA 415–18 (2d ed. 2006). A reference category is not required 
with an interval scale (or a ratio scale). In data analyses in a pair of earlier 
studies, I employed ordered three-category independent variables as interval 
scales by not having a reference category for each variable, but I incorrectly 
referred to the categories as ordinal scales. Law as Symbol, supra note 20, at 
320 n.166; The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 655 n.140. Especially 
because the categories for each of these independent variables were derived 
from a ratio scale, the categories were justifiably used as interval scales. 
135 In general, age differences in social values probably result from 
differences between generations in educational attainment, i.e., age itself 
probably has little effect on most social values. See DAVIS, supra note 131, at 
62. Aging, on the other hand, can affect values. Nicholas L. Danigelis et al., 
Population Aging, Intracohort Aging, and Sociopolitical Attitudes, 72 AM. 
SOCIOL. REV. 812 (2007); David J. Harding & Christopher Jencks, Changing 
Attitudes Toward Premarital Sex: Cohort, Period, and Aging Effects, 67 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 211, 225 (2003). The effect of the aging process on values can 
be measured with cross-sectional data from sample surveys, but only if the 
surveys have been conducted in different years and cover a substantial time 
span. The effect of aging cannot be measured using information on age from 
a single survey. GSS surveys have not gathered the data required to assess 
the possible influence of the aging process on MORALITY. See NAT’L OPINION 
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at app. U. 
136 Xavier Hansen, Back to the Future: The Origins and Return of 
Sociology as the Scientific Study of Societal Development (Aug. 2004) 
(unpublished paper presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association) (on file with author). 
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model included modes of thought and conduct that are cultural 
dimensions of a society. Whether law seeks to regulate a 
particular activity is evidently a function in part of culture, i.e., 
of how the participants in a society perceive, and hence react to, 
their social world. For example, public support for a state law 
banning same-sex marriage is higher when same-sex marriage is 
seen as jeopardizing traditional social values regarding family 
and sex roles.137 Because law is shaped by morality and because 
morality is a function of culture, the content of law can be 
expected to respond to and incorporate the content of culture. 
The variables employed in the regression model as aspects or 
indicators of culture were the respondent’s beliefs as to whether 
individuals are in control of their lives (FATALISM) and whether 
trust in people is warranted (TRUST). An additional cultural 
variable was the frequency of prayer by respondents 
(PRAYFREQ), which was assumed to be a measure of the more-
general factor of religiousness. While no quantitative study 
seems to have been done on the relationship between any of 
these three independent variables and the dependent variable in 
the instant study, such relationships are suggested by logic 
and/or by some empirical research. The view that morality is a 
private issue, and thus a subject that is inappropriate for 
regulation by government, seemed likely to vary with inter alia 
(i) the belief that the participants in the society are able to 
manage their future,138 (ii) a belief by participants in the 
trustworthiness of other participants,139 and (iii) commitment to 
                                                          
137 Rory McVeigh & Maria-Elena D. Diaz, Voting to Ban Same-Sex 
Marriage: Interests, Values, and Communities, 74 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 891, 
907 (2009). 
138 Among individuals, degree of fatalism and at least one aspect of 
morality depend in part on degree of self-direction. Carmi Schooler et al., 
Occupational Self-Direction, Intellectual Functioning, and Self-Directed 
Orientation in Older Workers: Findings and Implications for Individuals and 
Societies, 110 AM. J. SOCIOL. 161, 185 fig.4 (2004). Fatalism and morality, 
therefore, are correlated in some ways and to some extent. 
139 Trust among the members of a group having a subsistence economy 
seems to be necessary for the group to survive. See W. G. Runciman, Stone 
Age Sociology, 11 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 129, 134–35 (2005) 
(contending that during the Stone Age the survival of a group depended on 
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religion.140 
B. Data Analysis 
In the instant study, maximum-likelihood logit coefficients 
were estimated for the independent variables in the regression 
model. Linear (least squares) regression could not be used 
because the dependent variable was dichotomized; a dataset with 
such a dependent variable requires logistic regression.141 Given 
the use of logistic regression and the coding employed for the 
dependent variable, the regression coefficient and odds ratio 
computed for an independent variable express, for each change 
in category on the independent variable, the change in the odds 
that morality was regarded as private.142 In this regard, the 
reader should keep two points in mind. First, the regression 
coefficient and odds ratio for an independent variable estimate 
the impact of that independent variable on MORALITY while 
holding constant the effects of the other independent variables in 
the regression model. Second, an independent variable that 
                                                          
cooperation among its members and the expectation of such cooperation). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, research has found that trust broadly affects other 
types of groups, including social systems that are affluent and complex. 
Social Productivity, supra note 41, at 825–27. In light of this research, a 
relationship between trust and morality is plausible a priori. 
140 See Ramona Houmanfar et al., Religion and Cultural Survival, 51 
PSYCHOL. REC. 19, 27–28 (2001) (discussing the link between religion and 
morality). 
141 FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1–10 (2000); Alfred 
DeMaris, A Tutorial in Logistic Regression, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 956, 
957–58 (1995). 
142 An understanding of logistic regression requires that two concepts—
probability and odds—be distinguished.  A probability is a proportion, while 
odds are a ratio of two probabilities. PAMPEL, supra note 141, at 11–13. As 
explained infra in Part III-B of the text, the regression results reported in 
Table 2 and Table 3 are based on data for 162 interviewees. Of the 162, 76 
were coded 1 on MORALITY and 86 were coded 0. Therefore, the probability 
that morality would be regarded as private by an interviewee in this group 
was 76 ÷ 162 = .469, the probability that morality would be regarded as 
public was 86 ÷ 162 = .531, and the odds that morality would be regarded 
as private was .469 ÷ .531 = .883. 
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increases the likelihood that morality will be deemed private 
evidently reduces the likelihood that regulatory law will be 
adopted. In the United States, an activity is not explicitly 
addressed by law, or is explicitly protected by law from 
regulation, when the activity is designated as private by a 
substantial share of the population.143 
Because the GSS selected interviewees with cluster 
sampling—i.e., because the GSS sampled sets of individuals144—
an adjustment was made to the standard errors that were 
calculated by the statistics program (Stata) in estimating the 
regression coefficients.145 Specifically, each standard error from 
the estimation by Stata was multiplied by the square root of 
1.42, i.e., by 1.19, in an attempt to remedy the effect of the 
sampling design.146 Tables 2 and 3 infra report the regression 
                                                          
143 Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological Framework, supra 
note 22, at 15–18. 
144 See Wikipedia, Cluster Sampling, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cluster 
_sampling (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
145 The coefficients and their unadjusted standard errors were estimated 
with Stata Release 10.0 using the LOGIT command. 2 STATACORP., STATA 
BASE REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 10 178–93 (2007) [hereinafter STATA 
REFERENCE MANUAL]. The estimation procedure did not employ either 
sampling weights or household-size weights. Sampling weights for the GSS 
require data on the cluster variable. STATACORP., STATA USER’S GUIDE: 
RELEASE 10 § 20.17.3, at 280 (2007). Data on the cluster variable, however, 
were not available. The adjustment that was made to the estimated standard 
errors, as described in the text, is an imprecise way of compensating for the 
omission of sampling weights and the cluster variable. 
Household-size weights were considered unnecessary because they are 
unlikely to alter materially the results obtained when analyzing GSS data. C. 
BRUCE STEPHENSON, WEIGHTING THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS FOR BIAS 
RELATED TO HOUSEHOLD SIZE 1 (1978), available at http://publicdata. 
norc.org:41000/gss/DOCUMENTS/REPORTS/Methodological_Reports/MR0
03.pdf. In addition, household-size weights have the disadvantage that they 
reduce the statistical efficiency of population parameter estimators such as 
regression coefficients. Id. at 3. Efficient estimators are preferred because 
they are likely to be closer to their population parameters than inefficient 
estimators. RONALD J. WONNACOTT & THOMAS H. WONNACOTT, 
ECONOMETRICS 58–60 (2d ed. 1979). 
146 The need for the adjustment, and the use of √1.42 for the adjustment, 
are explained in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological 
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coefficients, the adjusted standard errors for the coefficients, and 
the two-tailed levels of statistical significance for the coefficients 
based on the adjusted standard errors. The tables also show the 
constant in the regression equation and label it α. 
Regression coefficients were initially estimated using data on 
164 respondents.147 With a significance level of .10 as the 
criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis,148 three independent 
variables—educational attainment, sex, and frequency of 
prayer—were related to the dependent variable. The 
relationships can be more easily understood by converting each 
regression coefficient into the percentage change in the odds that 
a respondent will be coded 1 on MORALITY when the 
independent variable in question rises by a measurement 
category. Considered in these terms, the odds that morality 
would be deemed a private matter were 70% lower for 
respondents with thirteen or more years of schooling than for 
respondents with twelve or fewer years schooling, were 246% 
higher for females than for males, and rose by 87% for each 
                                                          
Framework, supra note 22, at 33–34. 
147 A score (0 or 1) on MORALITY was available for 305 respondents. See 
the text following supra note 128. However, the regression results were 
based on no more than 164 of these respondents because data on one or more 
of the independent variables did not exist for 141 respondents. Two factors 
were primarily responsible for the inability to use the 141 respondents in the 
regression analysis. First, the 1991 GSS gathered data on certain variables 
only from subsamples of the full sample; of the independent variables in the 
instant study, TRUST was not measured in one of the three subsamples in the 
1991 GSS. NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 2561, 2571. 
Because the full sample was not asked the question for TRUST, there were 
interviewees with data on MORALITY but not on TRUST. Second, some 
interviewees who had a score of 0 or 1 on the dependent variable and who 
were asked all of the questions measuring the independent variables either did 
not answer a question for one (or more) of the independent variables or 
responded to a question on an independent variable with an answer that was 
outside the coding employed by the instant study (which coding is described 
in Table 1). 
148 As discussed in Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological 
Framework, supra note 22, at 35 n.84, caution is required when relying upon 
tests of statistical significance. 
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increase in category of prayer frequency.149 
To determine whether the results obtained might be 
misleading, a check was made for outliers, i.e., interviewees 
whose coding on the dependent variable differed from the coding 
that was predicted by the regression model. Outliers can 
materially distort the coefficients estimated in a regression 
analysis, and in order to identify influential outliers in the study, 
Cook’s Statistic was calculated.150 Unfortunately, the process of 
locating influential outliers is subjective,151 and thus I visually 
examined the distribution of Cook’s Statistic.152 Doing so 
revealed that Cook’s Statistic was far higher for two of the 
interviewees than for any of the others.153 Accordingly, I omitted 
these interviewees and re-estimated the regression model. In re-
estimating the coefficients, however, Stata dropped the variable 
BORN, because the code of 1 on BORN perfectly predicted the 
code of 0 on MORALITY and thereby prevented an estimation of 
maximum likelihood.154 
Given the problem with BORN, the regression analysis was 
confined to the remaining independent variables. Tables 2 and 3 
report the regression coefficients estimated for the independent 
variables without BORN and without the two interviewees who 
had the largest Cook’s Statistic. The coefficients in Tables 2 and 
3 are thus based on data for 162 interviewees. In addition to 
presenting the regression coefficients, the tables show the 
adjusted standard error for each coefficient, the z score obtained 
                                                          
149 The odds ratios for these three variables were -0.298, 3.4647, and 
1.873, respectively. Percentage changes were obtained from the regression 
coefficients with the LISTCOEF command. LONG & FREESE, supra note 134, at 
94–98, 464–67. 
150 Id. at 128. 
151 DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION 175–76 (2d ed. 2000). 
152 A visual examination of the distribution is suggested in LONG & 
FREESE, supra note 134, at 151. 
153 For these two interviewees, Cook’s Statistic was 0.99 and 2.16. For 
the other interviewees, Cook’s Statistic was less than 0.60. 
154 A maximum-likelihood regression coefficient cannot be estimated for 
an independent variable that predicts the dependent variable without any 
error. HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 151, at 138. 
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with the adjusted standard error of the coefficient, and the two-
tailed statistical significance level for the z score.155 
Table 2. Logit Coefficients and Significance Levels from 
Regression of MORALITY on Independent Variables 
 
Independent 
variable 
(mnemonic 
label) 
 
 
 
Regression 
coefficient
 
 
Adjusted 
standard 
error
 
 
 
 
z
 
 
 
 
p>|z| 
 
Structural 
variables 
AGE 
EDUC 
RACE 
REALINC 
SEX 
XNORCSIZ 
 
Cultural 
variables 
FATALISM 
PRAYFREQ 
TRUST 
 
α 
 
 
 
 
 0.297 
-1.151 
-0.104 
 0.295 
 1.289 
 0.232 
 
 
 
-0.744 
 0.677 
 0.385 
 
-2.441 
 
 
 
 
0.307 
0.456 
0.662 
0.481 
0.468 
0.324 
 
 
 
0.777 
0.286 
0.456 
 
1.322 
 
 
 
 0.97 
-2.52 
-0.16 
 0.61 
 2.75 
 0.72 
 
 
 
-0.96 
 2.37 
 0.84 
 
-1.85 
 
 
 
0.34 
0.02 
0.88 
0.55 
0.01 
0.48 
 
 
 
0.34 
0.02 
0.41 
 
0.07 
 
 
                                                          
155 The null hypothesis was used to compute the z scores in Table 2 and 
Table 3, i.e., every independent variable was assumed to be unrelated to the 
dependent variable in the population from which the sample was drawn. Each 
z score in the tables, accordingly, is the number of standard errors by which 
the regression coefficient obtained from the sample deviated from a 
regression coefficient of zero in the population that was sampled. EMILIO J. 
CASTILLA, DYNAMIC ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 154–55 (2007). 
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The regression model without BORN yielded results that were 
similar to the regression model with BORN. The signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients that were statistically significant at 
or below .10 did not differ materially between the two models. 
Based on Table 2, the odds that morality would be regarded as a 
private matter were 68% lower for respondents with thirteen or 
more years of schooling than for respondents with twelve or 
fewer years of schooling, were 263% higher for females than 
for males, and rose by 97% with each increase in category of 
prayer frequency.156 Because the impact of an independent 
variable is estimated holding constant the impact of every other 
independent variable in the regression model, the percentage 
change in odds produced by a rise in category on an independent 
variable is net of the percentage change in odds produced by a 
rise in category on every other independent variable. 
In considering the results reported in Table 2, a possibility 
that must be explored is whether interaction existed between 
independent variables. If the relationship of one independent 
variable to the dependent variable differed across categories or 
levels of another independent variable—i.e., if interaction was 
present—the results in Table 2 do not accurately explain 
MORALITY. The failure to uncover interaction thus would yield 
incorrect conclusions regarding the manner in which independent 
variables act on the dependent variable. 
Theory rather than statistics should guide the selection of 
independent variables to evaluate for potential interaction.157 In 
light of this principle, it is notable that women in general have 
been found by research to be more religious than men in 
general, and a theory has been advanced that ascribes this 
divergence in religiosity to sex-based differences in biology.158 
                                                          
156 The odds ratios were 0.316 for EDUC, 3.631 for SEX, and 1.969 for 
PRAYFREQ. 
157 JAMES JACCARD & ROBERT TURRISI, INTERACTION EFFECTS IN 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION 3–4 (2d ed. 2003); WILLIAM D. BERRY, 
UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ASSUMPTIONS 30–31 (1993). 
158 Rodney Stark, Physiology and Faith: Addressing the “Universal” 
Gender Difference in Religious Commitment, 41 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 495, 
495–500, 504 (2002). 
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Consequently, I investigated the possibility that there was 
interaction between SEX and PRAYFREQ by estimating the 
regression coefficients for the independent variables (other than 
SEX) separately for women (n = 95) and for men (n = 67). The 
results are presented in Table 3, with the results for women in 
the top panel of the table and the results for men in the bottom 
panel. 
Table 3. Logit Coefficients and Significance Levels by Sex 
from Regression of MORALITY on Independent Variables 
 
Independent 
variable 
(mnemonic 
label) by sex 
 
 
 
Regression 
coefficient
 
 
Adjusted 
standard 
error
 
 
 
 
z
 
 
 
 
p>|z| 
 
Women 
 
Structural 
variables 
AGE 
EDUC 
RACE 
REALINC 
XNORCSIZ 
 
Cultural 
Variables 
FATALISM 
PRAYFREQ 
TRUST 
 
α 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.232 
-1.318 
 0.000 
 0.247 
 0.341 
 
 
 
-1.724 
 0.475 
 0.377 
 
 0.184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.424 
0.592 
0.856 
0.576 
0.418 
 
 
 
1.382 
0.398 
0.571 
 
1.935 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.55 
-2.23 
 0.00 
 0.43 
 0.82 
 
 
 
-1.25 
 1.19 
 0.66 
 
 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.59 
0.03 
1.00 
0.67 
0.42 
 
 
 
0.22 
0.24 
0.51 
 
0.92 
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Men 
 
Structural 
variables 
AGE 
EDUC 
RACE 
REALINC 
XNORCSIZ 
 
Cultural 
variables 
FATALISM 
PRAYFREQ 
TRUST 
 
α 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.306 
-0.936 
 0.247 
 0.503 
-0.001 
 
 
 
-0.261 
 0.908 
 0.418 
 
-3.276 
 
 
 
 
 
0.480 
0.798 
1.135 
0.979 
0.571 
 
 
 
1.277 
0.454 
0.805 
 
2.318 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.64 
-1.17 
 0.22 
 0.51 
 0.00 
 
 
 
-0.20 
 2.00 
 0.52 
 
-1.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.53 
0.25 
0.83 
0.61 
1.00 
 
 
 
0.85 
0.05 
0.61 
 
0.16 
 
 
Perhaps the most notable finding that emerges from Table 3 
is the failure of even one explanatory variable to have regression 
coefficients that were statistically significant both among women 
and among men. Among women, only education had a 
significant coefficient. When this coefficient is converted into an 
odds ratio, the odds that morality would be considered private 
are found to be 73% lower for women who had thirteen or more 
years of schooling than for women who had twelve or fewer 
years of schooling. Among men, frequency of prayer had the 
sole significant coefficient; the conversion of this coefficient into 
an odds ratio shows that the odds that morality would be deemed 
private rise 148% for each category increase in PRAYFREQ.159 
However, the relationships uncovered by these coefficients have 
no discernible logical connection to each other, and without an 
identifiable pattern to the relationships, the coefficients in Table 
                                                          
159 The odds ratio for EDUC among women was 0.268; the odds ratio for 
PRAYFREQ among men was 2.480. 
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3 for EDUC among women and PRAYFREQ among men stand on 
their own. 
C. Discussion 
When the regression model employed in this study is 
evaluated with the results in Tables 2 and 3, just one 
independent variable is able to claim a general relationship to 
whether adults in the United States regard morality as private or 
as public.160 Net of the other independent variables in the model, 
gender alone had an unconditional effect on social values 
defining morality as private or public. The influence that gender 
exercised, moreover, was far from trivial: the odds that morality 
would be deemed private were fully three-and-a-half times 
greater among women than among men.161 
Tables 2 and 3, however, do not exhaust the insights that can 
be gleaned from the data. A fuller understanding of the effect of 
gender can be obtained from the accuracy with which 
independent variables in the instant study predicted whether 
interviewees would view morality as private or as public. 
Accuracy was determined first by regressing MORALITY on just 
SEX (Model 1) and then by regressing MORALITY on the three 
independent variables—EDUC, SEX, and PRAYFREQ—whose 
coefficients in Table 2 were found to be statistically significant 
(Model 2). The regression analyses used the same 162 
interviewees as Tables 2 and 3. The measure of accuracy is the 
percentage of all predictions by a model that were correct. The 
percentages are in Table 4.162 
                                                          
160 The reader should keep in mind that the instant study utilizes cross-
sectional data and that, because change over time cannot be observed, such 
data produce erroneous conclusions regarding causal relationships more often 
than longitudinal data. Public-Private Dichotomy in a Macrosociological 
Framework, supra note 22, at 33. 
161 Supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
162 The percentages were computed in Stata with the ESTAT 
CLASSIFICATION command and its default probability cutoff, i.e., ≥ 0.5. 
STATA REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 145, at 166–67. 
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Table 4. Predictions by Independent Variables: Correct 
Predictions as a Percentage of All Predictions 
 
 
 
 
 
Prediction 
 
 
Correct predictions from
 
Model 1: 
SEX
 
Model 2: 
EDUC, SEX & PRAYFREQ 
 
Morality private or 
morality public 
 
Morality private 
 
Morality public 
 
 
63.6% 
 
 
59.0% 
 
70.2% 
 
 
72.2% 
 
 
67.8% 
 
77.3% 
 
I begin with Model 1. For predictions with SEX alone, 
accuracy was 63.6% when considering both predictions of 
interviewees who would classify morality as private and 
predictions of interviewees who would classify morality as 
public. However, the overall percentage masks a difference: 
Model 1 was noticeably less successful in predicting 
interviewees who would view morality as a private matter (59%) 
than in predicting interviewees who would view morality as a 
public matter (70.2%). 
I turn now to Model 2, which retains gender as an 
independent variable but adds educational attainment and prayer 
frequency. As Table 4 shows, the use of the three independent 
variables together greatly improved success in predicting the 
interviewees who would regard morality as private and the 
interviewees who would regard morality as public. Specifically, 
the three independent variables jointly increased the accuracy of 
predictions by not less than seven percentage points. Although 
educational attainment influences the designation of morality as 
private or public only among women and prayer frequency 
influences the designation only among men (see Table 3), the 
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two variables enhance the ability of gender to identify persons in 
terms of their social values on the private or public nature of 
morality. 
IV. CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND THE CONTENT OF 
LAW 
Perhaps it should not be surprising that women and men 
differ materially in their social values on whether morality is a 
private matter or a public issue. After all, much if not most of 
social life is affected to some extent by the attribute of biological 
sex and by the different roles in society that are attached to this 
attribute.163 In the discussion that follows, however, I focus not 
on the sociology of gender but on the importance for law of the 
findings in Tables 2, 3, and 4 that pertain to gender. The 
findings, I suggest, may help to explain the change in the 
interpretation of the United States Constitution by the U.S. 
Supreme Court with respect to set of related issues that were 
presented in cases spanning almost forty years.164 Unfortunately, 
the paradigm that currently dominates the legal profession is 
unlikely to recognize the contribution to the change that may 
have been made by the gender difference in social values on 
morality. That paradigm, by embodying the concept of “the rule 
of law,” assumes the primacy of law. In doing so, the paradigm 
ignores the subservience of law to conditions in the social 
system. 
The law to which the findings are relevant involves 
sexuality. Currently, the U.S. Constitution is construed to bar 
government penalties for nonpublic, noncommercial sexual 
                                                          
163 Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Gender Inequality in Law: 
Problems of Structure and Agency in Recent Studies of Gender in Anglo-
American Legal Professions, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 681, 697 (1998). 
164 My reasoning assumes that the relationships reported in Tables 2 and 
3 are not confined to 1991, the year in which the data for these tables were 
obtained. The assumption is plausible at least with regard to gender. As 
reported supra in note 156 and accompanying text, gender had a very large 
impact on whether morality is deemed to be a public issue or a private 
matter. An impact of this magnitude is unlikely to occur in just a single year. 
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activity—homosexual as well as heterosexual—between adults 
who consent to the activity and who are capable of giving 
consent.165 The prohibition on penalties for such activity is based 
largely on a right of privacy that the U.S. Supreme Court 
believes emanates from the liberty guarantee that is explicit in 
the two due process clauses of the Constitution.166 Indeed, the 
line of cases through which the Court announced that the 
Constitution protects sexual activity between adults that is 
consensual, nonpublic, and noncommercial began with a case 
decided in 1965 in which the Court explicitly employed the 
concept of a right of privacy.167 Notably, the Court has 
expressed a concern with privacy even when, in invalidating 
government penalties for sexual activity and closely related 
matters, it seems to have relied on other grounds—for instance 
the liberty guarantee alone168 or the equal protection guarantee.169 
                                                          
165 Val D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The 
State Marriage Amendments as Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 271 
(2005). 
166 Francisco Valdes, Anomalies, Warts and All: Four Score of Liberty, 
Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2004). The Fifth Amendment 
and the Fourteenth Amendment contain similarly worded liberty guarantees.  
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”). While the liberty guarantee in the Fifth 
Amendment is applicable to the federal government, the liberty guarantee in 
the Fourteenth Amendment covers state government.  Heiner v. Donnan, 285 
U.S. 312, 326 (1932). 
167 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). In Griswold, 
the Supreme Court inferred a right of privacy from a number of constitutional 
provisions. Id. at 485. In 1973, the Court attached the right of privacy to the 
liberty guarantee of due process, at least insofar as the right pertains to 
marriage, family, and sexuality. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
168 Government penalties for nonpublic, noncommercial, consensual 
same-sex sexual activity were held unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Although the Court repeatedly refers to the liberty 
guarantee in the Constitution, it concludes that the state statute at issue 
“furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”  Id. at 578 (emphasis added). 
The Court thus explicitly focused on privacy, suggesting that the 
constitutional right at issue is a right directed at protecting privacy. Id. 
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By accepting privacy as an important concern, the Court implied 
that the right at issue was a right to privacy even though its 
holding was not explicitly based on privacy. 
The preceding change in law, I believe, is explained partially 
by the findings reported in Part III of this Article. In order to 
develop the explanation, I turn to a quantitative indicator of the 
social status of men relative to the social status of women in the 
United States. The indicator, which is portrayed graphically in 
Figure 1, is the difference between the percentage of men and 
the percentage of women who, at age twenty-five to twenty-
nine, possessed at least a Bachelor’s degree in each decennial 
census year from 1940 to 2000.170 Because the data are for seven 
equally spaced time points covering a total of sixty years, Figure 
1 supplies a census-based measure of social status differences 
grounded on gender during most of the twentieth century. 
 
                                                          
Furthermore, the Court in Lawrence approved a passage in an opinion it had 
previously authored that described sexually relevant activities as entailing 
“the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.”  
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)) (emphasis added). In crafting its opinion in Lawrence, the Court 
also adopted a passage from a dissenting opinion written for an earlier case; 
the passage stated that the “intimate choices by unmarried as well as married 
persons” were beyond the constitutional powers of government to regulate. 
Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stephens, J.. dissenting)) (emphasis added). The word “intimate” connotes 
privacy.  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 945 
(3d ed. 1992) (defining “intimate” as an adjective to include “[m]arked by 
informality and privacy” and “[v]ery personal; private”). 
169 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall  . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws . . . .”). In ruling that a state statute violated the equal 
protection guarantee by restricting to married persons the distribution of items 
to be used for preventing pregnancy, the Court emphasized the relevance of a 
constitutional right of privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972). 
170 The data for Figure 1 are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A HALF-
CENTURY OF LEARNING: HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940 TO 2000 tbl.2 (2006), http://www. 
census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/phct41.html. 
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Figure 1.  Sex Gap at Age 25-29 in Percentage with Bachelor's or Higher Degree
 
 
To appreciate fully the importance of the data in the figure, 
it is necessary to realize that the male-female difference in 
educational attainment in the United States for most of the 
century-and-a-half after the Civil War was mainly at the college 
level.171 The difference between men and women in college 
completion, therefore, is a useful barometer of the relative status 
of each sex at a single point in time and of change in the relative 
status of each sex over time.172 The indicator does not capture 
                                                          
171 ANDREA ADAMS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE 
UNITED STATES: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (2008), http://www. 
census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/educattn.html; JAMES P. SMITH & 
MICHAEL P. WARD, WOMEN’S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 39 tbl.20 (1984), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/ 
2007/R3119.pdf. In addition, see infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
172 Figure 1 provides just a measure of the magnitude of a status 
differential between men and women in a given year. The figure thus 
assumes that, at each point in time, a male-female difference in social status 
is correlated with the male-female difference in rates of college completion. 
Figure 1 makes no assumption as to whether or how the two variables (social 
status and college completion) are causally connected. 
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every dimension of sex roles and status, of course. However, 
the indicator is useful because it measures an attribute of 
individuals early in their lives, and the attribute has the potential 
to affect markedly later stages of the life cycle, especially in 
terms of occupation and income from employment. 
Unfortunately, the figure cannot be extended further back in 
time—i.e., cannot cover years prior to 1940—because the census 
did not gather information on educational attainment until 
1940.173 
The shift in law on sexuality and related matters that the 
United States experienced from the mid-1960s onward is likely 
to be attributable partially to the shift in the status of women 
that Figure 1 reveals.174 Understanding this link will be aided by 
a brief explanation of the figure. In particular, Figure 1 was 
constructed from the difference between the percentage of men 
twenty-five to twenty-nine years old and the percentage of 
women twenty-five to twenty-nine years old who, in the census 
year specified, possessed a Bachelor’s degree or a higher 
degree. Because the percentage for women was subtracted from 
the percentage for men, a number above zero means that 
proportionally more men than women held a degree; conversely, 
a number below zero means that proportionally more women 
than men held a degree. The horizontal line across Figure 1 
serves as a reference and marks the point at which the 
percentage for men is equal to the percentage for women. When 
the trend line—the line connecting the male-female difference in 
degrees in each census year—is moving away from the 
                                                          
173 ADAMS, supra note 171. Data from the census of 1940 have been 
employed in conjunction with other data to estimate years of schooling 
completed and degrees received by five-year cohorts born in 1866–1870 and 
later. SMITH & WARD, supra note 171, at 35 nn.6 & 7. However, the 
estimates are for educational attainment of each birth cohort during the 
lifetime of the cohort, not at a specific age. 
174 The data described in supra note 173 have been used to show that the 
sex gap in college-level education generally predicts U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions during most of the twentieth century on whether the national 
Constitution is violated by government policies that distinguish males and 
females. LARRY D. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT 50–55 
(1993). 
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horizontal line, the gender gap in college completion is 
expanding, and when the trend line is moving toward the 
horizontal line, the gender gap is contracting. 
Figure 1 shows that the male advantage in Bachelor’s and 
graduate degrees at age twenty-five to twenty-nine rose 
substantially from 1940 to 1960, fell slightly from 1960 to 1970, 
and then began a steep descent. Indeed, the decline after 1970 
was so large in magnitude and rapid in speed that by 1990 a 
slightly larger percentage of women than of men in the twenty-
five to twenty-nine age group held a Bachelor’s or higher 
degree.175 In the history of a nation, alterations in social structure 
of this size and swiftness are probably infrequent. 
The change in the gender gap that is portrayed in Figure 1 is 
likely to have contributed to the change that took place after the 
middle of the twentieth century in law on sexuality and its 
incidents. In evaluating the plausibility of such a link, an 
important point to keep in mind is that the gender gap in Figure 
1 is measured by college completion among individuals who 
were twenty-five to twenty-nine years old. The age range that 
was used for the measure (i.e., age twenty-five through age 
twenty-nine) is important for two reasons. First, since most first-
year college students in the last half of the twentieth century 
evidently matriculated in college shortly before or after their 
eighteenth birthday,176 the pursuit of a Bachelor’s degree by 
                                                          
175 It is probably not coincidence that, after removing the effects of the 
different choices that men and women in the United States make due to sex 
roles, there was only a small gender gap in compensation from employment 
in 2000.  June O’Neill, The Gender Gap in Wages, Circa 2000, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 309, 313 tbl.3 (May 2003) (models 2 and 3). Because current 
compensation evidently involves a lengthier process than educational 
attainment, a gender-linked compensation differential can be expected to 
respond more slowly than a gender-linked education differential to the 
societal forces that alter the status of women vis-à-vis men. 
176 For example, at the time of the 1970 census (which occurred on or 
around April 1, 1970), 83.6% of all first-year college students (male and 
female) who were younger than twenty-five had been seventeen, eighteen or 
nineteen years old when the 1969–70 academic year started (or, more 
precisely, on October 1, 1969). Calculated from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1970 
CENSUS OF POPULATION. Vol. II. Series PC(2). 5A SUBJECT REPORTS: 
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persons who hold such a degree at age twenty-five to twenty-
nine started normally when these persons were much younger—
specifically, an average of about nine or ten years younger. 
Thus, the societal changes that affected educational attainment at 
age twenty-five to twenty-nine, but did so differently among 
women than among men, happened (or at least began) 
approximately a decade before women and men were in this age 
range. Second, the societal conditions that determine the college 
matriculation rates of women and of men probably do not have 
an instantaneous effect. Rather, the conditions are likely to 
operate with a time lag, and although the number of years that 
must pass for the effect to materialize is unknown, a half-decade 
could be required. When the two preceding points are combined, 
the small contraction of the sex gap between 1960 and 1970, and 
the large contraction that started in 1970, must be understood as 
responses to societal changes that took place or that had their 
inception more than a decade earlier. Consequently, the societal 
foundation for the higher status of men relative to women was 
evidently beginning to erode by 1950, and in the 1960s and 
later, the pace of the erosion markedly increased. 
What societal consequences flowed from the changes that 
occurred in the gender-based status differential during the last 
half of the twentieth century? The answer may be the following. 
Because the odds that morality will be treated as a private matter 
are much higher among women than among men, the changes in 
the societal foundation for the status of women vis-a-vis men 
during the 1950s and 1960s—the changes that altered the course 
of the trend line in Figure 1—probably enhanced the prominence 
                                                          
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 119 tbl.5 (1970), available at http://www2.census. 
gov/prod2/decennial/documents/42045400v2p5a5cch01.pdf. In late 1969, 
consequently, five out of six first-year college students who had not reached 
age twenty-five were a maximum of one year away from age 18. The 
proportion of these students who earned a Bachelor’s degree is unknown. 
However, among women who are enrolled in college when they are younger 
than twenty, relatively few seem not to complete a Bachelor’s degree before 
their thirtieth birthday. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Rosalind Berkowitz King, Age 
and College Completion: A Life-History Analysis of Women Aged 15–44, 75 
SOCIOL. EDUC. 211, 219 fig.1 (2002) (cumulative completion rates estimated 
from figure 1). 
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and influence of the view that issues of morality are not 
appropriately handled in a public setting or by a public body. As 
the status of women rose, in other words, the values of women 
were increasingly a factor in social life and were incorporated 
into law. Sexuality and related matters, therefore, gradually 
came to be regarded as beyond the scope of government 
regulation. In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
government prohibitions on the use by married couples of items 
to prevent pregnancy were inconsistent with a constitutionally 
based right of privacy.177 This ruling may not have represented a 
major jurisprudential step because the law had traditionally 
considered the relationship between spouses to be private.178 
Subsequently, however, the view that sexual activity and its 
incidents are private rather than public matters was extended to 
other government restrictions on adults. Thus, complete or 
almost-complete bans on aborting pregnancies were held 
unconstitutional not only when directed at an adult female who 
is unmarried179 but also when directed at an adult female who is 
married and cannot secure the consent of her husband.180  Most 
recently, the view that sexuality is a private concern was 
responsible for the invalidation on constitutional grounds of 
government prohibitions on same-sex sexual activity between 
                                                          
177 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
178 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1979) (describing the 
purpose and historical roots of the privilege against adverse testimony by a 
person against her/his spouse). During the last half of the twentieth century, 
the privilege that allows a married person to bar testimony against the person 
by his or her spouse when the testimony involves confidential marital matters 
became less prevalent, and the conditions under which the privilege could be 
exercised were narrowed.  Id. at 48–50. These changes are consistent with 
the evident intensification of individualism that has occurred in the United 
States since the middle of the century and with the equalization of the status 
of men and of women that accompanied or resulted from greater 
individualism. Individualism and gender equality are probably the result of 
the long-term growth of knowledge. Law as Symbol, supra note 20, at 336–
37; The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 628–32, 678–79. 
179 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54, 165 n.67 (1973). 
180 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70–71 
(1976). 
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adults that is consensual, nonpublic, and noncommercial.181 
If the higher social status of women had an impact on law 
governing sexuality, how large was the impact? Unfortunately, 
an answer to the question is not possible at the present time, 
because the answer needs to deal with the net impact of the 
change in women’s social status. The findings in Tables 2, 3, 
and 4—together with the data in Figure 1—suggest that there 
were two effects on social values bearing on whether morality is 
public or private and that to some degree these effects offset one 
another. According to the findings in Tables 2 and 3, social 
values that classify morality as private are affected by gender, 
and they are affected even more when educational attainment 
and prayer frequency are added to gender as causal agents. 
However, while the odds that morality will be considered a 
private issue are appreciably higher among women than men, 
the regression coefficient for educational attainment among 
women is negative in Table 3. Accordingly, social values that 
assign morality to the private sphere become less widespread as 
women acquire more schooling. 
In short, the enhanced status of women in society, as 
represented by sex differences in rates of college completion, 
poses a problem for understanding whether and how the law was 
influenced by social values on whether morality is a private 
matter or a public issue. If the reasoning I have proposed is 
correct, the changing societal conditions that improved the status 
of women relative to the status of men magnified the effect of 
sex per se, thus expanding the prevalence and influence of social 
values that deem morality to be a private matter and an 
unacceptable subject for regulation through law. On the other 
hand, the societal forces that were responsible for the higher 
status of women resulted in more years of college-level 
schooling for a larger proportion of women.182 The increases in 
                                                          
181 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In addition, see supra note 
168. 
182  SMITH & WARD, supra note 171, at 36 tbl.18 (rates of college 
attendance and completion among women by birth cohort); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, supra note 170 (percentage of women twenty-five to twenty-nine 
years old who had received at least a Bachelor’s degree by census year from 
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educational attainment among women, in turn, reduced the 
extent to which the social values of women designated morality 
as private and, presumably, the influence of these values in 
society. 
Was the change in social values that was brought about by 
gender on its own neutralized by the change in social values that 
was brought about by gains in college attendance and completion 
among women? The question is important because the answer 
has the potential to advance our understanding of the processes 
involved in the shift in law on sexuality that the United States 
underwent starting in the mid-1960s. Regrettably, an answer is 
not possible with the evidence that is currently available,183 and 
additional research is required. However, it is unlikely to be a 
coincidence that the odds of classifying morality as private are 
much higher among women than among men and that the status 
of women was rising relative to the status of men during the 
same period in history in which law was liberalizing on sexual 
activity and its incidents. Like every society, the United States is 
a social system, and in a system, concurrent phenomena are 
presumptively interconnected, not independent. Therefore, the 
                                                          
1940 to 2000); see also U.S. Census Bureau, Table A-2: Percentage of the 
Population 3 Years Old and Over Enrolled in School, by Age, Sex, Race, 
and Hispanic Origin: October 1947 to 2008, http://www.census.gov/ 
population/socdemo/school/TableA-2.xls (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) 
(percentages of women at age 18–19, age 20–21, age 22–24, and age 25–59 
who were enrolled in school between 1947 and 2008). 
183 Standardized regression coefficients allow two (or more) explanatory 
variables to be compared for their relative impact on the dependent variable. 
In the instant study, the standardized regression coefficients based on the 
standard deviations of the explanatory variables (rather than on the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable) may indicate that the effect of gender 
outweighed the effect of increased college-level education among women. 
Specifically, for the results in Table 2, the coefficients standardized on the 
standard deviation of their respective independent variables were -0.577 for 
EDUC and 0.637 for SEX. The standardized coefficient for SEX was thus 
somewhat larger than the standardized coefficient for EDUC. However, the 
utility of standardized coefficients in logistic regression remains to be 
established, especially when the dependent variable is measured as a dummy. 
PAMPEL, supra note 141, at 32. In the instant study, the dependent variable 
(i.e., MORALITY) was a dummy. See supra tbl. 1 in the text of this article. 
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proposition is at least plausible, and indeed seems probable, that 
the influence in society of social values treating morality as 
private was affected appreciably more by the sex attribute and 
associated social roles than by the extent to which women 
achieved a college-level education. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The biological attribute of sex has been and remains a 
cornerstone of social structure in the United States,184 and to the 
extent the societal significance of the attribute results from male-
female differences in hormones that cause male-female 
differences in behavior,185 sex-based distinctions will not be 
eliminated from social life even if they are prohibited by law. 
Notably, during the last half of the twentieth century, U.S. law 
incorporated a doctrine of female-male equality and disapproved 
various socially significant sex-based distinctions. When 
interpreting the Constitution, for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court discarded traditional beliefs regarding the place of women 
in society and endorsed the view that women are entitled to go 
beyond the roles of wife and mother.186 The same view appeared 
in federal statutes.187 
A description of a shift in law, of course, is only a first step; 
an explanation of the shift and its timing is also needed. In my 
macrosociological framework, the shift in law on the sex 
attribute is presumed to have resulted from substantial change in 
the degree to which and/or the manner in which the attribute 
                                                          
184 Kathy A. Thomack, Centering Men’s Experience: Norah Vincent’s 
Self-Made Man Complicates Feminist Legal Theorists’ Views of Gender, 15 
BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 30 (2006) (contending that the sex attribute is the 
most influential of societally defined characteristics in shaping social behavior 
and self-conception). 
185 J. Richard Udry, Biological Limits of Gender Construction, 65 AM. 
SOCIOL. REV. 443 (2000). 
186 Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of 
Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and 
Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 220–60 (2003). 
187 The Roots of Law, supra note 26, at 632–34 (federal statutes 
prohibiting sex-based discrimination in employment). 
BARNETT REVISED.DOC 6/28/2010  2:29 PM 
604 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
was organizing society. While all of the aspects of the changed 
sex basis of social structure are probably still unknown, Figure 1 
reveals that the status of women increased relative to the status 
of men after 1960. However, the shift in U.S. law was not 
confined to female-male distinctions per se; as discussed in Part 
IV, the shift extended to sexuality.188 Unless the breadth of the 
shift is assumed to be happenstance—which would not accord 
with the tenet of science that the world is orderly—it can be 
explained. The results of the data analysis in Part III suggest that 
at least a partial explanation is a sex difference in social values 
regarding morality as a private or public matter. If so, these 
values are a link in a chain of causation between women’s 
relative status in society and law bearing on the sex attribute and 
sexuality. 
The macrosociological framework I have proposed, however, 
is not limited to a single topic or to a single set of related topics. 
On the contrary, the framework contends that, in a democratic 
nation, all of the fundamental concepts and doctrines of law are 
attributable to their societal context. The framework thus denies 
that law is self-contained and self-determined, that law has 
primacy over other elements of the social system, and that law is 
permanently shaped by individual personalities. Instead, the 
framework maintains that the important concepts and doctrines 
of law found in a democracy (i) are generated by the properties 
of society (e.g., average educational attainment) and (ii) undergo 
change as the properties of society are altered by large-scale 
forces (e.g., the growth of knowledge). The framework also 
maintains that the impact of the macro-level forces on societal 
properties typically occurs slowly (and perhaps at an uneven 
pace) and that the societal properties affected by these forces 
normally produce new law when (and because) thresholds are 
reached. 
Although a macrosociological framework does not accord 
with any paradigm that is widely accepted at the present time in 
scholarship on law, such a framework merits investigation. The 
framework not only is consistent with a considerable body of 
                                                          
188 Supra notes 165–69, 177–81. 
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empirical evidence, but it can benefit social life by promoting 
research on the societal causes of law. In particular, research on 
the jurisdiction-level causes of law can be expected to lead to 
predictions of new law. If the proposed framework has utility, 
such predictions can be made well in advance of the emergence 
of the law being predicted, because alterations in jurisdiction-
level properties usually occur over many years before generating 
law. Although the predictions will not always be accurate, they 
are likely to be correct much more often than they are incorrect. 
If so, quantitative studies of the jurisdiction-level conditions that 
shape law will allow a democratic nation to (i) prepare for new 
law and (ii) appreciate that important doctrines in its law do not 
depend in the long run on individuals, no matter how influential 
the individuals seem to be. Insofar as (ii) is prevalent, there will 
be less socially harmful conflict in a democracy over law that 
deviates from traditional cultural values. Especially if it involves 
violence and threats of violence, conflict can undermine the 
social order, as illustrated in the United States with regard to 
law on abortion and the provision of, and access to, abortion 
services.189 Because law on important aspects of social life at a 
given point in history expresses the character of society rather 
than the idiosyncrasies of individuals, however, conflict directed 
at such law will not—indeed, cannot—have an enduring effect, 
and efforts to eliminate the law will have no more than 
temporary success. To the extent the foregoing is acknowledged, 
conflict over law that breaches social convention will be 
understood as futile. The probable result will be that such 
conflict will not occur as frequently, and when it occurs, it will 
not be as protracted. 
 
                                                          
189 S. REP. NO. 103–17 (1993), available at 1993 WL 286699. From the 
late 1970s to the early 1990s, “[a] nationwide campaign of anti-abortion 
blockades, invasions, vandalism and outright violence” in the United States 
was found to be “endangering the lives and well-being of the health care 
providers who work there and the patients who seek their services.” Id. at 3. 
